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vAbstract
Implementation theory has been a central focus of the policy process. How a
policy gets implemented can take many forms. Implementation can take a top-down
approach, a bottom-up approach, or an approach that combines the two. Most scholarship
today looks at these various approaches from the perspective of a single, small-scale
policy problem.
This study looks at how Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) get
implemented and once implemented, how they are monitored and achieve compliance.
Implementation is looked at through the lens of historical institutionalism. Within this
framework, the issues of sovereignty, collective action, capacity building, and resources
are evaluated. This is done through the analysis of the National Reports submitted by the
parties to the agreements and an original paper interview mailed out to the implementing
agencies of the MEAs studied.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
Multilateral Environmental Agreements offer scholars a unique opportunity to
view implementation theory on a global scale. Once an MEA is ratified and entered into
force it must then be implemented. This is no easy task. Implementing a single policy at
the local level is difficult enough. Trying to implement a global environmental policy can
be daunting. There are many actors and institutions involved in the process and all must
come to some sort of agreement as to who will be responsible for implementation, how
implementation will take place, what sort of timetable will be involved, and where in the
institutional structure is to begin and end. Many of these questions are answered, at least
on paper, in the actual agreements. But how the “paper” process translates into reality is
not always clear.
This question is one of the core questions of this research but it is not enough to
look simply at implementation in order to see the big picture. Once the agreements get
implemented, how are they monitored? How do the monitoring agencies gain
compliance? If the agreements are implemented and a system for monitoring is in place
and parties are complying, does this translate into effectiveness? Compliance does not
guarantee effectiveness. A party to an agreement may be doing everything that it is bound
to do by the MEA but if what they are doing is having no effect on the environmental
problem, then how effective is the agreement? In order for an MEA to be effective,
compliance must be taking place and it must be having an impact on the problem. Can we
really explain or predict effectiveness based on how an MEA is implemented, monitored,
and complied with? As this research will show later on, if compliance is making a
difference, then effectiveness can be predicted.
2Implementation, monitoring, and compliance all have a direct impact on
effectiveness of an MEA but there are also indirect factors which impact these three
processes and ultimately, effectiveness as well. These include sovereignty, collective
action, and capacity building. In general terms, sovereignty is the right of any nation state
to exercise power over its own territory without outside interference. When dealing with
MEAs, the question arises, do parties to these agreements cede some level of sovereignty
by signing on? The short answer to this question is yes. Once a party signs an agreement
it already relinquishes some level of sovereignty by agreeing to abide by a set of rules
that may encompass actions within and/or outside of the party’s own borders. It is almost
a given that at this point any notion of “absolute” sovereignty is gone. The more relevant
question may be; what happens to sovereignty after the party signs on to the agreement?
How do parties reconcile their desire to abide by the agreement and their desire to
maintain control over their own territory?
MEAs are collective action on a global scale. As with sovereignty, once a party
signs on to an agreement, it is in essence agreeing to be a part of the collective action. In
a sense, once a party signs on to the agreement, the collective action problem is solved.
This does not diminish its importance in studying MEAs. There are hundreds of
international agreements today all dealing with “global” commons problems and all
requiring a collective action solution. The challenge we face today is going beyond
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” and Ostrom’s “common pool resources” that deal
only with small scale, local problems. What these authors have done, though, particularly
Ostrom, is lay the groundwork upon which solutions to global commons problems can be
built. This is an issue which will be explored throughout the dissertation.
3Capacity building is also a factor in the success of implementation, monitoring,
and compliance of an MEA. More recently it has become the focus of many MEAs. A
party’s ability to comply with an MEA has a great deal to do with its capacity to do so. It
is generally agreed that most countries have the intent to comply with agreements but
lack the capacity to do so. Capacity building depends a great deal on the resources that
are available and unfortunately, with many MEAs, this is an area that is lacking. Many
MEAs do not have their own financial mechanisms built in to the agreement and must
rely on outside sources for the financial and technical resources necessary for
implementation. The Montreal Protocol is one of the few agreements that has sufficient
resources and a mechanism for distributing these resources. It is viewed by most to be
one of the most successful MEAs in force today. Capacity building may turn out to be
one of the key factors in implementation of MEAs.
What brings this all together is the institutional framework of the MEA and this is
the focus of this dissertation. Implementation, monitoring, and compliance can only take
place if an institutional framework is in place. Most MEAs establish this framework at
the very beginning of the process and most are structured the same way: secretariat,
conference of the parties and a scientific and/or technical body. Many also include
provisions for NGOs and IGOs. Establishing this framework during the negotiation
process allows for stability in the MEA but also flexibility to adjust to changes. The core
structure remains the same but new institutions may be added as necessary. This is
especially true in the case of NGOs and IGOs. The important questions are, how do these
institutions influence the behavior of the parties to the agreements and what role do
institutions play in implementation, monitoring, and compliance?
4We cannot begin to understand how MEAs get implemented without first
understanding the role of institutions in this process. Although the institutional
framework among MEAs is fairly consistent, how states respond to these institutions may
vary. For this reason,
“institutions are important for helping us to understand the differences among
states in their approaches to environmental policy formation and who is involved
in the process. Peter Hall defines institutions as the formal rules, compliance
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship
between individuals in various units of the polity and economy. Institutions
structure interactions among political actors, influence their goals, and in this way
affect political outcomes. They can influence access to formal policy formation
process, mediate power relations among actors and establish certain political
incentives and constraints. In other words, institutions are critical intervening
variables that affect which voices have a say in policy formation. They do not, of
course, in themselves create policies, but rather they mediate interactions among
political actors involved in the policy making process” (Schreurs, 1996).
Institutions, therefore, play a key role in structuring the implementation of MEAs. It is
important to keep in mind though, that MEAs are not institutions. MEAs are documents
that in essence house the institutional framework to carry out the implementation of the
MEA.
Overview of MEAs
Within the international community, MEAs have become the chosen method for
dealing with international environmental problems. The consequences of these
transboundary environmental problems cross both political and physical boundaries.
Responses to these types of problems require a coordinated effort on the part of states
(Victor and Skolnikoff). The nature of these types of problems requires a global response
and this response comes in the form of an MEA.
MEAs are “agreements between states which may take the form of ‘soft-law,’
setting out non-legally binding principles which parties will respect when considering
5actions which affect a particular environmental issue, or ‘hard-law’ which specify
legally-binding actions to be taken toward an environmental objective” (Ministry for the
Environment). An MEA involves an agreement between two or more countries and
includes “international and regional conventions and protocols therein; where a
convention provides a general framework for action, protocols outline steps to address
specific problems” (Bhandari, 1).
The majority of MEAs date from 1972, after the Stockholm Convention.
According to Victor and Skolnikoff:
“more than half of the United Nations’ list of 170 multilateral environmental
agreements has been added in the last 25 years. Much of the cannon of
international environmental law – such as agreements to regulate trade in
hazardous wastes, global warming, and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer
– has been adopted only in the last decade” (Victor and Skolnikoff).
However, the first MEA actually dates back to 1868 and is the oldest European treaty
still in force (EBU, 1). This treaty, known as the Mannheim Convention or the
Convention on the Rhine, guaranteed freedom of navigation on the Rhine (EBU, 1). The
Mannheim Convention “was concluded in 1868 between the Rhine riparian states. Under
the agreement the EU member States which are also signatory states, transferred
responsibilities falling within the scope of the Convention to the Central Commission for
Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)” (EBU, 1). So, although it is generally agreed that the
influx of current MEAs began with the Stockholm Convention, the precedent for the
recent trend was established long before then.
The United Nations Environment Programme classifies MEAs into what it calls
“clusters.” There are five clusters: biodiversity-related conventions, atmosphere
conventions, land conventions, chemicals and hazardous wastes conventions, and
6regional seas conventions and related agreements. Treaties are also divided into three
categories:
1) core environmental conventions and related agreements of global significance
whose negotiation, development, and/or activities have been associated with
UNEP’s work, which is further reflected in a number of Governing Council
decisions dating back to the establishment of UNEP;
2) global conventions relevant to the environment, including regional
conventions of global significance that were negotiated independently of
UNEP; and
3) others, largely restricted by scope and geographical range (UNEP).
All of the MEAs used in this study are categorized as core environmental conventions.
The Montreal Protocol falls into the cluster of atmosphere conventions. The Convention
on Biological Diversity and the Convention on the Wetlands fall into the cluster of
biodiversity-related conventions. The United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification falls into the land conventions cluster, and, in fact, is the only agreement
in this cluster.
Overview of Implementation Theory and How it Relates to MEAs
It is believed by many that the study of implementation policy began with (or at
least became a focal point) Pressman and Wildavsky’s 1973 study of an Economic
Development Administration project in Oakland, California (O’Toole, 2000). Their study
brought implementation to the forefront of policy research. Up to that point, it had
“largely been a background issue” (O’Toole, 2000). Still, disagreements within the field
persist beginning with how to define policy implementation. According to O’Toole:
“policy implementation is what develops between the establishment of an
apparent intention on the part of governments to do something, or to stop doing
something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action. Some scholars include
here both the assembly of policy actors and action, on the one hand, and the
cause-effect relationship between their efforts and ultimate outcomes, on the
other. Others, including myself, have emphasized the importance of making a
conceptual distinction between implementation (action on behalf of the policy)
7and ultimate impact on the policy problem. Implementation research concerns the
development of systematic knowledge regarding what emerges, or is induced, as
actors deal with a policy problem” (O’Toole, 2000).
If scholars are emphasizing different aspects of the process then implementation research
is inconsistent at best. For this reason, a very specific definition of implementation will
be used when dealing with implementation of MEAs.
Implementation of MEAs is by far the most difficult component of the
international policy process. Implementation at the local, state, or national level can be a
challenge and problems often occur at each stage of the policy process. Trying to reach
consensus among competing agencies and organizations can be difficult. This difficulty
becomes magnified as one moves to the international level. Multilateral agreements
introduce unique problems not the least of which is having to deal with different
countries run by different types of institutions who may view their roles in the
implementation process differently as well.
Because of the diversity of MEAs, implementation can be a very complex issue.
Different parties to these treaties view their obligations in different ways. Some feel that
because they did not directly contribute to the problem, their obligation should be less
than those who are major contributors. Some major contributors feel no obligation to
solve the problem. For economic reasons, the United States has recently said that it will
not abide by its signature on the Kyoto Protocol. Regardless of the reason given, many
countries may view the US's position as hypocritical because it is one of the largest
contributors to the problem. There is a general fear that if the United States does not
abide by the agreement then others may follow its lead. This view could negatively affect
the ratification process.
8Implementation also encompasses enforcement, compliance, monitoring, and
dispute resolution. Each signatory may have a different interpretation of exactly what it
means to comply with a particular treaty. And simply because a country complies with an
MEA does not necessarily mean that the treaty has been successfully implemented or is
effective (Weiss and Jacobson, 1998). As one author puts it, “environmental problems are
scientifically, politically, and economically complex and do not lend themselves to quick
and easy solutions, especially at the international level” (Piddington, 19). Another claims
that there is
“a huge deficiency in implementing and enforcing treaty norms. The reasons are
manifold and very complex: besides the missing will of the States to relinquish
their sovereignty with regard to the use of natural resources and to decide
themselves on implementation according to their national policies, financial and
socioeconomic aspects as well as the lack of knowledge in the natural science of
interrelated causes and effects may be the main obstacles for effective
implementation” (Rest, 32).
The issue of implementation is an important one, especially considering the
number of multilateral treaties in existence today. According to Weiss and Jacobson,
however, “we know very little about national implementation and compliance with the
treaties and other international legal instruments that have been negotiated, despite their
importance and growing number” (Weiss & Jacobson, 1). They continue, “international
accords are only as effective as the parties that make them. Effectiveness is the result not
only of how governments implement accords but also of compliance” (Weiss &
Jacobson, 1). This is an important point because it emphasizes the importance of
successful implementation and compliance. As the authors point out, “learning about
implementation and compliance is an essential first step to learning about effectiveness”
(Weiss & Jacobson, 6).
9Definition of Implementation
Lester and Stewart define implementation in the following way:
"The stage of the policy process immediately after the passage of a law.
Implementation, viewed most broadly, means administration of the law in which
various actors, organizations, procedures, and techniques work together to put
adopted policies into effect in an effort to attain policy or program goals" (Lester
and Stewart, 104).
The above definition is a good "generic" definition of implementation. For the purposes
of this research, a more specific definition will be used that relates directly to the
implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. It is also not enough to define
just implementation; definitions of compliance and effectiveness must also be taken into
consideration.
It is important to note much like the term institution, the definitions of implementation,
compliance, and effectiveness are subject to interpretation by scholars. For this reason,
with the exception of the definition of effectiveness, the definitions given in the
Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of MEAs, will be used for this research.
Since these are the definitions given by UNEP, they seem appropriate for this study. The
Guidelines do not provide a definition of effectiveness so Faure and Lefevere’s was
chosen.
In this research, implementation will refer to “all relevant laws, regulations,
policies, and other measures and initiatives that contracting parties adopt and/or take to
meet their obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and its amendments,
if any” (Guidelines on Compliance 2). Compliance will refer to “the fulfillment by the
contracting parties of their obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and
any amendments to the multilateral environmental agreement” (Guidelines on
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Compliance 2). The definition of effectiveness to be used will be Faure and Lefevere's:
effectiveness will refer to "whether treaties that are correctly complied with actually
achieve the objectives stated in the treaty, or whether the treaty actually helped to reach
the environmental goal for which it was designed" (Vig and Axelrod, 139).
A second problem occurs in the approach taken to implementation research. In the
post Pressman/ Wildavsky era, a “proliferation of studies brought, in turn, an explosion in
types of research designs, varieties of models, and especially proposals for adding a
bewildering array of variables as part of the explanation for the implementation process
and its products” (O’Toole, 2000). This, in turn, led to a “set of sectarian disputes:
qualitative and small-n versus quantitative, large-n investigations; top-down versus
bottom-up frameworks; policy design versus policy-implementation emphasis, and so
forth” (O’Toole, 2000).
The fact that implementation theory dealt mainly with a single policy issue being
implemented by a single agency led to still another problem. Implementation was seen as
occurring in one of two ways: top-down or bottom-up. In a top-down approach, “theorists
see policy designers as the central actors and concentrate their attention on factors that
can be manipulated at the central level” (Matland, 1995). A bottom-up approach, on the
other hand, emphasizes “target groups and service deliverers, arguing policy really is
made at the local level” (Matland, 1995). Today many researchers take the view that
implementation takes place with an approach somewhere in the middle; “some
convergence of these two perspectives, tying macrolevel variables of the top-down
models to the microlevel variables ‘bottom-uppers’ consider, is necessary for the field to
develop” (Matland, 1995).
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It is a “middle of the road” approach which may be the best approach to
implementation of MEAs. And it may be in the area of MEA research that
implementation theory makes another resurgence. For the most part, “implementation
research has been conducted in and regarding the United States…solid cross-national
comparative work has been especially lacking” (O’Toole, 2000). This is an area where
implementation of MEAs may have a profound effect on the field of implementation
theory. This is a point that O’Toole makes as well. He says that:
“one of the topics on which cross-national comparative implementation research
can bear fruit, and has done so to some extent already, is on the execution of
international agreements, especially multilateral ones. The typical circumstances
is a common policy and a number of signatory countries. Hundreds of such
agreements now present important empirical circumstances for systematic study.
Early scholarship offers some cross-national comparisons but additional
investigations are clearly needed” (O’Toole, 2000).
It is in this area that this research hopes to make a contribution.
Overview of the Research Problem
This research looks at how MEAs get implemented and the role institutions play
in the implementation process. As previously stated, MEAs have become the chosen
method for dealing with transboundary environmental problems. If this is to be the future
trend in dealing with global environmental issues then it is important that we understand
how these agreements get implemented and how successful (or unsuccessful)
implementation affects the effectiveness of these agreements. If we cannot find the keys
to successful implementation then these agreements are in essence, useless. An MEA
needs to be something more than a symbolic gesture. MEAs are a call to action and the
call must be answered by the parties signing on to these agreements. If parties sign on
without any follow through then the agreements are basically moot. It is not enough to
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say we have an agreement to deal with the climate change issue, or the ozone layer, or
desertification. The agreements must be in a format that can be translated into action.
This study attempted to answer the question of how MEAs get implemented and
whether monitoring and compliance follow implementation. This was done using a paper
interview of four MEAs currently in force: the Montreal Protocol (MP), the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the Convention on
Biodiversity (CBD), and the Convention on the Wetlands (Ramsar). The National
Reports for each MEA were also evaluated. In the course of evaluating both the paper
interview and the National Reports it was discovered that the four MEAs were in
different stages of the implementation process. Some had been fully implemented (the
MP) while others were still in the development phase (the UNCCD). The level of
monitoring and compliance varied as did the views on the level of success of each of
these. The responses also showed discrepancies between what the respondents said about
their MEAs and what the National Reports actually showed. Even though self-reporting
in many ways is a matter of perspective, all the respondents appeared to be making an
effort to give honest responses. This, of course, is the major problem with self-reporting
but the paper interviews also offered invaluable insight into the four MEAs in this study.
Because of the small-n in the study (only 4 case studies used), it is not possible to
generalize these findings to discussions of all MEAs. It can offer us insight into the four
case studies used but will not allow any broad theories to be developed regarding
implementation of MEAs. What it can do is serve as a starting point for future research.
As more agreements are signed it will become increasingly more important for us to
understand why some work and why some do not. It is especially important to understand
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the role of institutions since in many ways they are the key to successful implementation.
If we are to rely on MEAs to “solve” our global environmental problems then they must
be effective. If we are going to try and “guarantee” any sort of effectiveness then we must
understand the implementation process. For this reason it is important for scholars to
focus their attention on the process of implementation. This research will explore more
specifically, “how intent translates into action that helps to solve international
environmental problems” (Victor and Skolnikoff, 1998).
Implementation: Enforcing, Monitoring and Compliance
This dissertation analyzes the interactions between the enforcing, monitoring, and
compliance sponsored by Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The focus is
on compliance as a measure of effectiveness for the MEA. Simply implementing an MEA
is not enough to guarantee success. There must also be a system in place for monitoring
and compliance including having the resources to accomplish these tasks. There must be
follow-up to bring those parties in non-compliance into compliance. There must be an
institutional structure in place within the MEA which spells out which organizations are
responsible for implementation, monitoring, and compliance and how these tasks are to
be accomplished. Effectiveness of the MEA depends upon each institution performing its
task well but without the proper guidelines and/ or resources, this may not occur. There
are challenges at each step in the process that may hinder progress. How the MEAs
respond to these challenges is directly related to how effectively they are implemented.
When the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in
Stockholm in 1972, there were only about three dozen MEAs. Today there are more than
900 international legal instruments (mostly binding) that are either focused on the
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environment or contain one or more provisions concerned with the environment (Weiss,
1998, 297). With so many agreements in force today, it is important to understand how
MEAs are enforced, monitored, and gain compliance. The guidelines for these three
components of implementation are laid out within the text of the treaty. The agreement
spells out which institutions are responsible for each and how these tasks are to be
accomplished. Some MEAs have separate sections for availability of resources and
funding. Those that do not have separate funding may face problems when it comes to
implementation, monitoring, and compliance. There are many factors which affect this
process and these factors affect different MEAs in different ways. These are the types of
issues to be addressed in this dissertation.
Because the number of MEAs has grown so dramatically over time, the need to
understand how MEAs work has also grown. There is also an increased interest in
protecting the environment and MEAs provide the framework for an international
response. The creation of the Kyoto Protocol and the concern most of the world has
shown for the climate change issue highlights this last point. MEAs provide a vast
resource for policy research, particularly in the area of implementation but it seems to be
an area that is lacking in research. As Weiss and Jacobson point out, "we know very little
about national implementation and compliance with the treaties and other international
legal instruments that have been negotiated, despite their importance and growing
number. Even if no more accords were to be negotiated, it would be essential to make
those that are in force work effectively" (Weiss and Jacobson, 1998, 1).
Implementation processes can vary among MEAs. Therefore one MEA may fail but
another may succeed. It is important to understand what factors account for these
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differences and what changes can be made to improve implementation of MEAs. As new
agreements are created, it is important to discover what works and what does not. What
are the factors that either hinder or help in the successful implementation of MEAs? By
analyzing the implementation records of current MEAs, scholars may be able to gain
insight into the workings of future MEAs.
The Research Questions
Once implemented, how do monitoring organizations get compliance with
MEAs? What role do institutions play in the implementation, monitoring, and compliance
of MEAs? Institutions vary among countries and this variation could affect all three
processes. What role, if any, does sovereignty play in the implementation process? Does
sovereignty hinder or enhance the process of implementation? How important are
resources in implementation, monitoring, and compliance? MEAs present environmental
problems that involve collective action on a global scale. Do MEAs provide a significant
mechanism for dealing with a global commons? Without successful implementation
parties will have difficulty gaining compliance. Expectations must be made clear so that
goals can be achieved. Successful enforcement and monitoring is key to gaining
compliance.
Figure 1.1 shows how the relationship of these three processes is viewed in terms
of this study. Each process builds upon the other until the ultimate goal of effectiveness
of the MEA is reached. These are the core relationships to be evaluated in this study.
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Defining Implementing Institutions
The question of what constitutes an institution needs to be clarified. The term
institution means different things to different people. According to Vig and Axelrod:
"The term institutions has been used differently by international theorists. Some
limit the term to formal organizations that have defined memberships, offices,
staffs, and other tangible facilities. Others use the term to cover almost any
regularized pattern of interaction or behavior, whether formally organized or not.
Some tend to equate international institutions with 'regimes,' while others draw
sharp distinctions between organizations and regimes. For our purposes, the term
institutions will refer to both formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that play a role in the
establishment, maintenance, and implementation of environmental policy
regimes" (Vig and Axelrod, 11).
In all likelihood, scholars adapt the meaning of institutions to fit within the parameters of
research they are conducting. As research on MEAs becomes more prevalent, the number
of institutions involved in the implementation process becomes greater. As Weiss and
Jacobson point out, "as countries have implemented MEAs, they have developed new
institutional features and refined and expanded others. Major developments include
regional networks for implementing treaties, implementation committees and
noncompliance procedures, active secretariats, increased use of scientific and technical
bodies, and enhanced roles for NGOs and the private sector" (Weiss and Jacobson, 159).
Consistent with Vig and Axelrod’s definition of institutions, the term institution will
refer to IGOs, NGOs and INGOs, and will also include all treaty secretariats, all
Conference of the Parties or Members of the Parties, all scientific and technical bodies,
and any private sector organizations that play a role in implementation. How well these
institutions operate within the context of the MEA is one point of focus for this research.
An important point to keep in mind is that the MEAs themselves are not institutions; they
are documents that house the institutional framework, and the role of that framework in
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shaping implementation is key.
Theoretical Framework
.Historical institutionalism was chosen as the framework for this study because it
recognizes the importance of institutions in structuring politics. It places the emphasis of
evaluation on the role of history and institutions in shaping policy over time. MEAs have
two characteristics that make them prime candidates for historical institutionalism. First,
implementation of MEAs is a process that evolves over time and needs to be evaluated as
such. It is necessary to look at the history of the MEA in order to understand its
development. Second, institutions play a key role in how MEAs get implemented.
Without fully understanding this role, we cannot understand what works and what does
not in the MEA context. It is believed that the findings of this study will foster a better
understanding of the role of institutions in the implementation of MEAs and give us an
idea of how to improve upon compliance, and thus the success of implementation, for
current and future MEAs. Historical institutionalism will allow us to evaluate
implementation, monitoring, and compliance among MEAs.
Summary of Findings
The primary data for the study came from a paper interview completed by
members of four MEAs currently in force. These are the Montreal Protocol (MP),
Ramsar (also known as the Convention on Wetlands), the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
(UNCCD). The respondent for the MP was the Deputy Executive Secretary for the Ozone
Secretariat. The respondent for Ramsar was a communications officer for the Ramsar
Convention Secretariat. The respondent for the CBD was a legal advisor responsible for
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reviewing implementation of provisions of the Convention and COP decisions. The
UNCCD respondent was the Associate Public Information Officer. Although we must
always be cautious when using self-reporting data, having responses from people with
first hand knowledge of their respective MEAs allowed the researcher to gain important
insight into the treaty process. There does not appear to be this type of research data
available in the current literature.
Organization of Dissertation
Chapter I provides the reader with the purpose of this research, design of the
study, and case selection criteria. An overview of MEAs and implementation, and
defining implementation for the purposes of this study is then presented. The chapter also
gives an overview of the four case studies included in this research along with an
overview of the data collection methods used in the study.
Chapter II lays out the theoretical framework used in the study. Historical
Institutionalism was chosen as the framework for this research and it is important to
understand why historical institutionalism, and not rational choice theory, was selected.
This chapter gives the justification for choosing historical institutionalism as well as an
overview of both rational choice theory and historical institutionalism.
Chapter IV provides an overview of sovereignty and collective action. These two
concepts are an important aspect of contracting parties and the MEAs to which they are
parties. It is important to understand the role they play in the implementation process and
how they relate to the research question in this study.
Chapter V examines the theoretical framework, offers a summary of the findings
in the study, and discusses their significance and relevance to the field of political
19
science.
Chapter VI provides an explanation of the research design, the case selection and
paper interview and analyzes the findings of the data for implementation, monitoring, and
compliance that was taken from the paper interviewss and the National Reports
associated with the four cases. Chapter VI answers the questions: are MEAs being
implemented effectively and are monitoring agencies getting the compliance needed for
successful implementation?
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CHAPTER II: Overview of MEAs and Issues of Implementation
It is important to study MEAs because the impact that they have is far reaching
and will be felt years down the road. More specifically though, it is important to study
MEAs because of the impact they can have on the study of institutions and
implementation theory. If we can understand the influence institutions have on
implementation of multilateral environmental agreements, then there is a possibility that
the treaty process can be enhanced. Currently there is a push for something called
"harmonization" of national reporting. As one author notes, "not enough has been done in
the area of harmonization of national reporting between environmental agreements. There
have been many cases of weak focal points in national government for the conventions.
These have contributed considerably to the lack of implementation of the agreements"
(Dodds, 4). The need for a harmonization of national reports shows the importance of
implementation for MEAs and the desire for effective implementation. This point
demonstrates the importance of further research in this area.
Definitions for the purposes of this research
The following definitions of MEA, implementation, monitoring, compliance,
effectiveness, and institution will be used for the purposes of this research:
MEA: Multilateral Environmental Agreement
IMPLEMENTATION: All relevant laws, regulations, policies, and other measures and
initiatives that contracting parties adopt and/or take to meet their obligations under the
multilateral environmental agreement and its amendments, if any (Guidelines on
Compliance, 2).
MONITORING: The processes used to determine the level of compliance with MEAs.
These may include observation, testing, data collection, and/or reporting.
COMPLIANCE: Compliance will refer to “the fulfillment by the contracting parties to
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their obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and any amendments to
the multilateral environmental agreement” (Guidelines on Compliance, 2)
EFFECTIVENESS: “Whether treaties that are correctly complied with actually achieve
the objectives stated in the treaty, or whether the treaty actually helped to reach the
environmental goal for which it was designed” (Vig and Axlerod, 139).
INSTITUTION: Refers to all Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and International Non-Governmental
Organizations (INGOs), treaty Secretariats, COPs, Scientific and Technical Bodies, and
any private sector organizations involved in monitoring, compliance, and
implementation.
Definition of Treaties and Multilateral Environmental Agreements
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as “an
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation” (Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1969, 3). Agreements that meet this definition are called conventions, protocols,
accords, pacts, or charters. They can be bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral
(among several countries). The focus of this research is on multilateral agreements
generally. More specifically, the research examines the implementation, monitoring, and
compliance of such agreements. In examining implementation, monitoring, compliance
and effectiveness are also taken into consideration.
There are five major steps that go into creating a treaty. In step one, negotiation,
representatives from the various governments meet to work out the provisions of the
agreement. During step two, the signature phase, each of these representatives signs the
treaty (although at this stage the signatures are not binding). In step three, ratification, the
signatures of the representatives become binding. Treaties are ratified based upon the
22
laws of the individual nations. Once the treaty is ratified, the signature nations become
parties to the treaty and are now legally bound to its terms. In the fourth step, called the
exchange of instruments of ratification, parties exchange the instruments of ratification to
indicate their consent to being bound by the terms of the treaty. The final and fifth step in
creating a treaty is publication. Once a treaty is published it becomes valid and binding
on the parties as of the date it enters into force (Source of information:
www.infoctr.edu/tutorial/international/About_Treaties.htm).
Multilateral treaties and agreements vary considerably in structure. The
obligations and commitments spelled out in each treaty or agreement are specific to that
treaty or agreement and can also vary considerably. One thing that many treaties have in
common is that they are designed to evolve over time to adapt to change. Edith Brown
Weiss refers to this as a treaty having a "living" history (Weiss, 90). Some of these
changes include new obligations, new roles for key players, and/ or new implementation
and monitoring activities (Weiss, 92). This flexibility allows changes to occur without
having to create a new treaty. And although there is a formal treaty amendment process,
many changes occur through less formal processes such as guidelines, annexes, or
decisions of the parties. Using such an informal and flexible approach tends to bring
about better cooperation among nations. Countries do not want to be coerced into having
to comply and these flexible methods offer an alternative to more coercive methods.
Having an informal and flexible approach may also help with implementation if countries
feel that they have some say in the implementation process rather than just being told
how something will be done. Also, since institutions used in implementation may vary
from treaty to treaty, it helps to have more informal and more flexible methods to address
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the problems of implementation. This is not a one-size fits all type of approach to
implementation and having a less rigid approach may help make implementation more
efficient and more effective.
The type of approach an MEA takes is an important consideration. It is a common
debate as to whether traditional command-and-control solutions work better than market-
based solutions. This debate is central to the emissions trading program. Much of
environmental regulatory policy, at least in the U.S., falls into the category of command-
and-control policy regulation. Non-compliance in these situations can result in fines,
penalties, litigation, or a combination of all three. In their book, Cleaning up the Mess:
Implementation Strategies in Superfund, Church and Nakamura evaluate three different
approaches to implementation. They use the Superfund because of its uniqueness. The
statutes give the EPA choices in how to deal with clean-up efforts. Church and Nakamura
refer to these as implementation strategies. The first of these is prosecution. This strategy
emphasizes coercion through the threat of having to pay for clean-up, administrative and
court orders, and heavy fines for noncompliance (Church and Nakamura, 10).
The second implementation strategy “emphasizes the need for all sides to resolve
differences in good-faith negotiations rather than through adversarial procedures”
(Church and Nakamura, 11). This approach is referred to as the accommodation strategy.
The third implementation strategy is “a policy tool that sidesteps the tension
between these two approaches altogether” (Church and Nakamura, 12). This strategy is
referred to as the public works approach. The view of this approach is to act first and “let
the lawyers and accountants fight over the bill later” (Church and Nakamura, 12).
Church and Nakamura found in their study that, “the government rarely pursues a
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‘pure’ prosecution, accommodation, or public works strategy at any particular site.
Enforcement activities in the real world often involve mixed strategies” (Church and
Nakamura, 12). They also found, however, that certain Superfund regions had “clear
orientations toward one or another of these alternatives in government actions” (Church
and Nakamura, 12). The actors involved, organizations, and institutions involved, and the
resources available all influence which implementation strategy will be attempted.
The type of approach taken to implementation becomes central to the discussion
of multilateral environmental agreements because the type of policy instrument used has
a great deal to do with the success or failure to implement a program. It has been argued
by some that “softer” approaches to policy, such as the emissions trading program and
(financial) incentives, tend to bring better results and “hard” approaches, such as formal
regulations and formal punishments for not adhering to regulations, should be used as a
last resort. As Weiss and Jacobson point out, their review of treaties in their research
"indicates strong reliance on methods associated with the sunshine approach, particularly
reporting; increased use of incentives; and little employment of sanctions. This is
consistent with methods used in other international environmental treaties" (Weiss and
Jacobson, 166). Their conclusions are echoed by Faure and Lefevere who write:
"Economic sanctions become increasingly difficult to apply with the development
of an increasingly comprehensive international trade regime. Approaches to
compliance problems now need to take into account the actual abilities of states to
comply, and sanctions for noncompliance need to be developed that fit within the
new international regimes. Solutions for compliance problems need to be based
more on what is referred to as a 'managerial approach' rather than on a more
traditional enforcement approach" (Vig and Axelrod, 141).
All of the agreements included in this study use a sunshine approach to encourage
compliance in the form of National Reports.
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One of the major findings of the 1998 Weiss and Jacobson study is that if
countries become “engaged” then implementation and compliance become more
effective. Becoming engaged “involves a broad commitment that is deeper than just
sections of the governments or even whole governments. The country must see that its
interests are served by complying with the treaty” (Jacobson & Weiss, 551). How we get
countries engaged has a great deal to do with their intention to comply and their capacity
to comply. These two factors vary greatly among countries. Countries may intend to
comply but lack the capacity to do so. Others may have the capacity to comply but never
intend to do so. Still others may have both the capacity and intent. Despite a country’s
intent or capacity, it still may take some encouragement to get them to comply.
Compliance
Compliance can be viewed from two different perspectives. One is compliance
through enforcement and the other is compliance through management. The question is
which of the two approaches is more effective in addressing non-compliance?
Enforcement theorists, “characteristically stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and
sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity-
building, rule interpretation, and transparency” (Tallberg 609).
According to Tallberg:
“the enforcement approach is firmly anchored in the political economy tradition
of game theory and collective action theory. States are conceived as rational
actors that weigh the costs and benefits of alternative behavioral choices when
making compliance decisions in cooperative situations. Both the sources of, and
solutions to, non-compliance stem from the incentive structure. States choose to
defect when confronted with an incentive structure in which the benefits of
shirking exceed the costs of detection through monitoring and the threat of
sanctions” (Tallberg 611).
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This goes back to the notion that simply because a country signs on to an agreement does
not mean that it intends to comply with it. It signs an agreement because it feels that it is
important to do so but may fail to follow through.
Based on much of the current literature though, countries do seem to be following
through. Parties generally tend to comply with their MEAs. Research done by Victor,
Raustiala, and Skolnikoff supports this view. According to these authors,
“noncompliance is typically the product of incomplete planning and miscalculation rather
than a willful act” (Victor, et al, 1998, 661). These authors found that the studies in their
book “confirm what is often claimed: almost all countries comply with almost all of their
binding international commitments” (Victor, et al, 1998, 661). Another study came to a
similar conclusion saying that there is an error in conceptualizing that most compliance
problems are due to intentional violations (Weiss and Jacobson, 1998, 39).
The generally held view in the current literature is that parties have the intent to
comply but lack the capacity to do so. Parties sign on to agreements in good faith but lack
the resources necessary to follow through on their commitments. The enforcement
approach is not a practical solution in these situations. The central part of the
enforcement approach is monitoring and sanctions. When instances of shirking and non-
compliance are detected by monitoring then a “punishment” can be meted out. When
combined, “monitoring and sanctions carry the capacity of deterring defections and
compelling compliance” (Tallberg 612). But you cannot compel compliance in a country
that lacks the capacity to comply. This is probably the reason that most MEAs adopt a
management approach to compliance.
The management approach is much different from the enforcement approach.
27
According to Tallberg:
“management theorists stress states’ general propensity to comply with
international
rules, owing to considerations of efficiency, interests, and norms. Non-
compliance, when it occurs, is not the result of deliberate decisions to violate
treaties, but an effect of capacity limitations and rule ambiguity. By consequence,
non-compliance is best addressed through a problem-solving strategy of capacity
building, rule interpretation, and transparency, rather than through coercive
enforcement” (Tallberg 613).
Capacity building is an important aspect of all the MEAs involved in this study,
particularly for developing parties which have a lower standard of living and industrial
base than developed parties. Many developing parties may have the intent to comply with
the agreements but simply lack the capacity to do so. Tallberg uses a quote from Oran
Young to emphasize this point as well; “the effectiveness of international institutions
varies directly with the capacity of the governments of members to implement the
provisions” (Tallberg 613). Capacity building takes resources. For developing nations,
resources are not always readily available. Developing nations must often rely upon
developed nations for the financial support necessary to carry through with
implementation. For this reason, many parties do not intentionally violate their MEA.
Parties may simply lack the resources and capacity to do so. Logically, the management
approach would be more beneficial and more effective in these situations.
One point to keep in mind, and one that many authors point out, is that
compliance and effectiveness are not the same thing. Simply because a country complies
with a treaty does not mean that the treaty will be effective. Many things can affect
compliance. As Lester and Stewart point out, "no scheme for compliance will work if the
implementers and those charged with compliance fail to agree on the goals of
implementation. Implementation goals will necessarily involve bargaining and
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negotiation among the various parties involved, including interests of the wider
community affected by these goals and standards" (Lester and Stewart, 108).
Purpose of Research
The purpose of this research is to examine the implementation of multilateral
environmental agreements. There is a great deal of research available on MEAs but much
of it is centered around rational choice theory and evaluates how individuals affect the
implementation process rather than the process itself. Much of the research is based upon
the premise that individuals are intentionally rational and that they will act in their own
self-interest. The belief being that parties sign on to agreements because they are going to
get something out of it. The problem with this view is that there is not much in the
literature to support the notion that parties to MEAs sign on to promote their own self
interest. Ideally the benefits of signing an agreement will outweigh the costs but this is
not always the case. The UNCCD deals with desertification. In general, desertification
does not occur in developed countries. They sign on to the UNCCD to assist the affected
parties with implementation through financial and technical resources. The costs for
developed countries in this case are greater than the direct benefits they will receive. And
yet, they still sign on to the agreement.
It may be that scholars get caught up in how they think parties should behave
based on a situation rather than seeing how parties actually behave. Much of the
scholarship on MEAs may be driven too much by theory rather than practical application.
There are many factors that affect the effectiveness of an MEA. A party’s behavior is just
one factor and not really the most influential or important one. An MEA really works
from the inside-out. As this research will show, institutions play a major role in
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implementation of MEAs. Not in how the parties affect institutional behavior but how
institutions shape parties behavior.
So, where does implementation theory fit into the development of MEAs.? How
are MEAs implemented? Once implemented, how are they monitored? How do
monitoring agents gain compliance? And, ultimately, how effective are MEAs? What
role do institutions play in implementation, monitoring, and compliance? Does
sovereignty play a role? What factors influence implementation, monitoring, and
compliance? These are many questions but few answers currently available.
One author points out:
"much of the work on multilateral environmental agreements has been a global
top-down approach. There has been very little attempt to link the local to the
national to the international, both in terms of information on impacts and upon
compliance. This has occurred at the same time, as there has been an increase in
the devolution of power to smaller units in many places of the world without the
creation of proper links between the different levels of government and the
international bodies" (Dodds, 4).
This is an important observation because the top-down approach is a key concept in much
of implementation theory. Some scholars, like Moore (1987) and Lipsky (1980), have
argued that implementation decisions are made at the bottom by street-level bureaucrats
rather than at the top. Still others, like Gaddie and Regens (2000), determined that an
approach somewhere in the middle may offer a better solution. In their study, the authors
examine the implementation problems of section 404 of the Clean Water Act that
attempts to regulate wetlands protection. Rather than a top-down approach or a bottom-
up approach, they developed a communications approach. Their findings indicated that
the problems with implementing section 404 stem from problems of communication
between the federal and state levels.
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Structure of MEAs
Some MEAs are designed with a top-down system. The Secretariat is at the top,
followed by the conference of the parties (COPs), then IGOs and NGOs, Scientific and
Technical Bodies, and outside groups and the private sector. The institutional framework
for MEAs is more or less preset in this manner but although the structure of MEAs may
appear to take a top down approach on paper, the reality of how institutions in an MEA
function may be completely different. Many COPs are extremely powerful in the treaty
process, particularly in the area of implementation. In three of the four treaties used in
this study the COPs are the decision makers. In these three cases, the COPs are ultimately
responsible for policy-making and implementation. This would seem to indicate an
approach more in line with Gaddie and Regens. The real power lies in the middle with
input from the top and bottom. An evaluation of MEAs within the framework of
historical institutionalism may show that the relationship among the different institutions
in MEAs is not hierarchical at all but lies somewhere in-between.
This current study was motivated by a need to “fill in the gaps” so to speak in
implementation theory as it relates to MEAs. MEAs do not fit neatly into any category of
implementation theory. None of the four MEAs in this study take a strictly top-down
approach or bottom-up approach. The MP was the only respondent to specifically
mention the Secretariat on the paper interview but the indications are the Implementation
Committee is the one with the power. The Secretariat is simply there to assist when
needed. CBD, Ramsar, and UNCCD all have the COPs as the primary policy makers. The
UNCCD, however, does take a bottom-up approach to implementation at the local level
and this is the specified approach in the National Action Plan (NAP) of each of the
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affected parties. It is apparent that implementation of MEAs cannot be explained by a
top-down approach or a bottom-up approach. The reality lies somewhere in-between.
Design of the Study
The present research is a case study of four MEAs: the Montreal Protocol (MP),
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar). Each of
these addresses a different environmental problem but are all evaluated in this study
using the same set of constructs; what impact do institutions, sovereignty, collective
action, implementation, monitoring, and compliance have on the effectiveness of the
MEA. All treaties have entered into force and have been ratified. The time frame for
these ranges from 12 years (UNCCD) to 31 years (Ramsar). Table 2.1 represents the
MEAs used in the study, the date they each entered into force, and the number of
contracting parties to each agreement.
TABLE 2.1
MEAS REPRESENTED IN THE PAPER INTERVIEWS
Entered into force Contracting Parties
MP June 1989 189
CBD December 1993 176
UNCCD December 1996 179
RAMSAR 1975 145
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CHAPTER III: The Theoretical Framework
Historical Institutionalism
The theoretical framework for this study is based upon historical institutionalism.
Historical institutionalism is one theory which emerged out of the behavioral revolution
in political science under the heading of new institutionalism. The basis for this new
institutionalism was that institutions matter. There was renewed interest in how
institutions shape political strategies and influence political outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen,
and Longstreth, 1992). This makes historical institutionalism particularly relevant to the
study of MEAs. According to one author:
“Historical institutionalism is particularly useful in understanding the way in
which actions and ‘institutions’ can shape further developments… Paul Pierson
argues that historical institutionalism is historical ‘because it recognizes that
political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time’ and
intitutionalist ‘because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of
these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether they be formal
rules, policy structures, or norms’” (Alanko, 2006).
Theda Skocpol, a well known historical institutionalist, lists three important
features that characterize historical institutional scholarship:
1) “historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are
inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars;
2) to develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or puzzles,
historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and
tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality;
3) historical institutionalists likewise analyze macro contexts and hypothesize
about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than just one
institution or process at a time.
Taken together, these three configurations add up to a recognizable historical institutional
approach that makes powerful contributions to our discipline’s understandings of
government, politics, and public policies” (Pierson and Skocpol, 3).
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Pierson and Skocpol also emphasize the importance of looking at processes over time. As
they say, “scholars working in this tradition have developed compelling methodological
and theoretical justifications for historically-grounded investigations – by which they
mean not just looking at the past, but looking at processes over time” (Pierson and
Skocpol, 5). Institutional changes may occur slowly over time. Focusing on just one
snapshot in time limits our ability to interpret these changes and may cause us to dismiss
their importance. Pierson and Skocpol believe that this is an important aspect of historical
institutionalism. According to the authors, “theoretical attentiveness to historical
processes represents a formidable comparative advantage of historical institutionalism,
especially since this attentiveness is linked to macroscopic analysis focusing on
institutions and organizations in addition to aggregates of people” (Pierson and Skocpol,
10).
Pierson and Skocpol’s view of historical institutionalism can be summed up in the
following way:
(1) it Probes uneasy balances of power and resources, and see institutions as the
developing products of struggle among unequal actors;
(2) it typically does meso or macro-level analyses that examine multiple
institutions in interaction, and operating in, and influenced by, broader
contexts;
(3) it analyzes how sets of organizations and institutions relate to each other and,
in turn, shape processes or outcomes of interest;
(4) it takes a macro approach.
Institutional characteristics are a key part of this research. It is not about how
individual behavior affects the institutions but how institutions get the behavior they
desire from the parties to the agreements. All MEAs establish an institutional framework
first. When an MEA is open for signature, the institutional framework is already in place.
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Historical institutionalists “define institutions as the formal or informal procedures,
routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity
or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 2). Parties signing these agreements are agreeing
to abide by these procedures, routines and norms set out by these institutions at the start.
Parties are aware up front that complying with these agreements may be costly both
financially and in terms of relinquishing some sovereignty. It is almost a given that, in the
beginning at least, the costs will outweigh the benefits. Many of the benefits of these
MEAs are not seen or felt until the agreements have been in force for several years. And
yet, parties continue to sign on.
The behavior of those involved in MEAs is very much driven by
institutions and not by the actor’s expectations but rather the expectations placed upon
the actors by the institutions. MEAs fall more in line with the view that “instead of seeing
collective behavior as a simple summation of individual actions, scholars are interested in
examining the specific mechanisms that shape interactions among individuals and
different patterns of outcomes. Institutions are seen as a critical contextual variable that
shapes behavior and thus collective outcomes” (Ferris and Tang, 4). Here again, the
individual does not shape the behavior of the institution, rather the institutions shape the
behavior of the individual. In the case of MEAs, the Secretariat, the COPs,
Implementation Committees, Scientific and/or Technical Bodies, IGOs, NGOs, and other
institutions all shape behavior of the parties relative to implementation, monitoring, and
compliance.
The institutional framework is set in place from the start and parties must adjust
their behavior accordingly. A strong foundation for a successful MEA is laid in the first
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step of the treaty process. It is in this negotiation phase that representatives from the
various organizations meet to work out the provisions of the agreement including the
institutional framework. By establishing this framework through negotiation, no one
country or party has more say than any other. The will of one nation is not imposed upon
another. Once this foundation has been laid it is important to maintain the integrity of the
institutional framework in the MEA. This is what makes them work. Decisions are made
by and for groups rather than individuals.
Historical institutionalism is an ideal theory for evaluating implementation
of MEAs. As Steinmo and Thelen say, "what has made this approach so attractive is the
theoretical leverage it has provided for understanding policy continuities over time within
countries and policy variation across countries" (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 10).
They continue, "institutional analysis also allows us to examine the relationship between
political actors as objects and as agents of history. Institutionalism provides the
theoretical 'bridge between men [who] make history and the circumstances under which
they are able to do so" (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 10). Historical institutionalism
focuses on the process of politics and policy-making within given institutional parameters
and how these processes occur is central to this approach. (Steinmo, Thelen, and
Longstreth, 7-9). New institutions may be added with amendments but the basic structure
remains intact. As Pierson and Skocpol point out:
“historical institutionalists demonstrate the ways in which institutions are remade
over time. Because of strong path dependence effects, institutions are not easily
scrapped when conditions change. Instead, institutions will often have a highly
‘layered’ quality. New initiatives are introduced to address contemporary
demands, but they add to, rather than replace, pre-existing institutional forms.
Alternatively, old institutions may persist but be turned to different uses by newly
ascendant groups. In either case, the original choices are likely to figure heavily in
the current functioning” (Pierson and Skocpol, 14).
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The focus of this study is not how actors shape institutional behavior but how
institutions shape actors’ behavior, particularly parties to the Conventions. How do the
institutions responsible for implementation, monitoring, and compliance gain
compliance?
There is some precedent for the use of historical institutionalism in the
international community. In a 2002 International Political Economy Group (IPEG) paper,
the group uses a historical institutionalist framework to chart “the fortunes of the labour
standards debate within the WTO across its first four ministerial meetings” (IPEG, 2002).
Within this context, “institutions are seen as intervening variables between wider events
in the global political economy and social, political and economic life. The core
assumption is that institutions matter; they are not neutral, autonomous entities; rather,
they exist within a specific context to which they are intimately and inextricably related”
(IPEG, 2002).
The IPEG also addresses the issue of continuity and change in institutions and
that historical institutionalism helps us to understand institutional development. This
understanding is achieved:
“through a set of tools which enable distinctions to be made in the way in which
institutions evolve. It assumes that much of the way in which institutions evolve is
incremental – that is, changes tend to be a the margins and ‘in keeping with
existing formats and ways of operating.’ However, at particular ‘moments’
fundamental change has the capacity to take place. These moments can result
from exogenous and endogenous factors (or combinations thereof); or, they can
arise from the development of a critical mass nurtured by ongoing
incrementalism. Nevertheless, these moments contain within them the potential to
produce a fundamental, qualitatively distinct shift in trajectory” (IPEG, 2002).
It is believed that historical institutionalism is the best choice for this study. A
central focus of this research is that institutions play a key role in influencing
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implementation, monitoring, and compliance. Although new institutions may be added at
any time the core institutional structure remains the same. The secretariats, the COPs, and
the scientific and/or technical bodies are put in place at the beginning of the negotiation
process. Other institutions, such as NGOs and IGOs may be added later on. The structure
allows the MEA to maintain some semblance of stability and yet allow for flexibility as
well. .
More than anything else, implementation is a process that occurs over time. In
the case of MEAs, this process may take years to occur. It may take several years before
the institutional framework is put in place for implementation, monitoring, and
compliance. Each MEA may go at a different pace depending upon the resources
available. MEAs also deal with large groups and many different kinds of groups. How
these groups interact with each other has a direct influence on the implementation
process. Environmental problems are also “macro” problems that involve many
interrelated institutions.
For these reasons, historical institutionalism was chosen as the framework for this
study. By viewing the MEAs in this study through the lens of historical institutionalism
we may be able to look at other MEAs and predict how parties and institutions will
behave when implementing, monitoring, and complying with other agreements such as
the Kyoto Protocol.
Sovereignty and Collective Action
Sovereignty
Webster's New World Dictionary defines sovereignty as "supreme and
independent political authority" (411). One common notion of sovereignty is that all
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states are equal in that they govern their own territory with “absolute” power. States are
often seen as "sovereign actors in the international arena, meaning that they are free to act
as they find necessary, unrestricted by any external authority or rules" (Vig and Axelrod,
140). For this reason, sovereignty is often seen as being at odds with environmental
issues because MEAs are often seen as putting constraints on state autonomy. But as one
scholar says, “because ecosystems and environmental processes do not respect state
borders, sovereignty itself becomes a key institution of global scale environmental
destruction. It creates a scale for decision-making, adjudication, and authority that does
not coincide with fundamental ecological realities and thus frustrates ecologically
responsible management” (Conca and Debalko, 86). One author even goes so far as to
say, “implementation is assumed to be difficult or impossible because of the strictly
voluntary relationship between sovereign states and international organizations” (Getz,
2).
Throughout history there have been definitions, doctrines, and principles written
to try and codify the meaning of sovereignty. Jean Bodin in 1577 defined sovereignty as
"the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth and a nation's practical capacity to
maximize its influence in the world." F. H. Hinsley defined sovereignty as "the final and
absolute authority in the political community." According to Waltz, "to say that a state is
sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external
problems. And finally there was the Harmon Doctrine of 1895. According to the Harmon
Doctrine, 'the fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of
every nation, as against all others within its own territory; rights rather than
responsibility, entitlement rather than obligation' (Liftin, 277). These all define
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sovereignty as a principle rather than a practice and at the center of all of these definitions
is the concept of absolute sovereignty.
More recently, sovereignty has come to be defined in a more practical sense.
Today, “the general principle of good neighborliness stands at the heart of contemporary
conceptions of sovereignty and environmental protection" (Liftin, 278). Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration states:
"in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction of control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"
(Liftin, 279).
In other words, states have the right to do what they want provided they do not cause
harm to any other states in the process. States have the right to sovereignty, but this right
is not absolute.
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration echoes this sentiment. Principle 2 states that
"states have the right to pursue resource policies within their domains without outside
interference and, in doing so, that they must consider the external effects on other states"
(Liftin, 279). Both of these principles strive to maintain a balance between a state's
sovereign rights and its responsibility to preserve the environment, within and without its
own boundaries.
This may be easier said than done. On paper it may sound reasonable but
whether states adhere to these principles is something different. States may still be more
likely to consider their own interests first and "will not easily assume responsibility for
the ecological well being of the globe. Global interests will often be advanced only when
they clearly coincide with the national ones" (Liftin, 280). States may agree to certain
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provisions but may balk at relinquishing sovereignty when it comes to implementation.
And, unfortunately, "there is no supranational organization to oversee compliance or
enforce obligations. When violations occur there are very few mechanisms built into
agreements for evaluating and adjudicating responsibility" (Liftin, 283).
Environmental issues bring new challenges to the concept of sovereignty.
According to Liftin, "the trend towards international cooperation in the face of 'the
seamless web of nature' has resulted in something more subtle but perhaps equally
profound: a shift in the practices and norms of sovereignty" (Liftin, 167). Countries need
to adapt to the changing world of environmental problems and the policies being
developed to deal with these problems. This growing number of environmental
agreements has led to what Liftin refers to as "sovereignty bargains" (Liftin, 167).
Sovereignty bargains are in essence trade-offs for states. Rather than ceding the larger
principle of sovereignty, states accept some limitations in exchange for certain benefits
(Liftin, 169-70). The end result, though, may be to alter the norms and practices of
sovereignty by changing expectations about autonomy, control, and legitimacy (Liftin,
170).
The issue of sovereignty adds complexity to dealing with MEAs. As more
international agreements are signed, absolute sovereignty tends to become moot. The flip
side to the argument presented above is the view that MEAs can actually be good for
state sovereignty. These types of agreements “do not inevitably erode state sovereignty
and may even strengthen it. By placing states at the center of institutional responses and
strengthening their capacity to act collectively, it is argued, the menu of choices available
to states is being expanded, not restricted” (Conca and Debalko, 86). The European
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Union (EU) is a good example of countries relinquishing some of their sovereign rights
for a “greater” good. The EU often speaks with one voice for all members, especially in
MEAs, yet all members still have the capacity to govern themselves and make their own
decisions. Many thought that adopting one currency, the Euro, would infringe upon the
sovereignty of member countries. Even so, twelve out of the fifteen members converted
to the Euro anyway. Most feel the remaining three will follow soon. In other words, it is
possible to reconcile the concept of sovereignty and MEAs.
Sovereignty is a principle but it is also a practice. As such, it is in constant flux.
For this reason, Liftin argues that rather than view sovereignty as just a "juridical
conceptualization", we should look at the operational dimensions of sovereignty. This
view she argues "is far more likely to generate useful insights into the impact of
environmental and other interdependencies on political structures and practices" (Liftin,
171). Sovereignty is no longer viewed simply as a static principle. It is now seen as a
historical institution whose norms and practices have changed significantly over time.
(Liftin, 195). Liftin continues that, "taken as a unitary concept, sovereignty is not
particularly useful theoretically because it is too easily reduced to either a rhetorical tool
or a monolithic reification. Taken as a cluster of practices undergoing multiple processes
of unbundling, contestation, and reconfiguration, it offers greater heuristic value" (Liftin,
196). This seems to echo the choice often offered between obeying the letter of the law or
the spirit of the law. Is the US Constitution a static document or does it breath and change
over time as the US changes over time? Sovereignty is not a concept that can simply be
taken at face value.
One approach to sovereignty is the concept of sovereignty bargains. Sovereignty
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bargains are those that involve trade-offs and/or concessions made by countries in dealing
with environmental problems. One problem in dealing with the issue of sovereignty is
that it is understood to mean different things to different people. How the term is
understood influences how it is applied. Liftin says that sovereignty should be understood
as involving rights, capacities, and responsibilities in three realms: (1) those under a
state's jurisdiction, (2) those under other states' jurisdictions, and (3) those in the
commons. Sovereignty bargains affect all three elements in all three realms (Liftin, 171)
The "sovereignty bargains" argument put forth by Karen Liftin may be
particularly relevant to this research for a few reasons. First, Liftin says that, "the concept
of sovereignty bargains is likely to be particularly useful for those focusing on
international environmental institutions because these typically represent trade-offs
among sovereignty's multiple dimensions. One avenue of inquiry is the extent to which
sovereignty bargains are structured differently for different states" (Liftin, 196). The role
of institutions is a key focus of this research and the view is that the same institutions
may function differently in different states and yet still allow for the level of cooperation
necessary for MEAs to function effectively. Some level of trade-off is necessary for this
to occur and more likely than not, this trade-off comes in the area of sovereignty.
There are other factors that may affect the outcome of sovereignty bargains. The
nature of the environmental problem itself may play a role. Transboundary environmental
problems have a more far-reaching impact than local issues. How much states are willing
to give up in order to address these issues is not always clear. How much influence on
sovereignty norms do they assert through implementation, monitoring, and compliance
with a brokered solution? Sovereignty is often assumed to be eroded by efforts to address
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transboundary environmental problems. While states may claim sovereignty over the
resources and activities within their territories, they have come under mounting pressure
to manage their resources according to internationally agreed upon norms (Liftin, 1).
”When the physical effects of decisions made elsewhere manifest themselves in your
sovereign space, your ability to exercise sovereignty has been problemitized” (Liftin, 32).
How large a problem this is depends upon the type of issue being addressed and the
institutions already in place to deal with the issue.
Liftin specifically mentions that sovereignty bargains can help deal with
transboundary environmental problems. Transboundary environmental problems are
those that occur in one state or country but the impacts are felt across borders. The Kyoto
Protocol is an MEA designed to deal with such a problem. The effects of Greenhouse
Gases are felt everywhere, not just in the offending countries. This type of problem
requires an international response but many countries may be reluctant to sign on to an
agreement if they do not consider themselves an offender. And yet 163 countries have
signed on to the Kyoto Protocol with the understanding that some concessions on
sovereignty are going to have to be made for Kyoto to succeed. Kyoto is a good example
of an agreement where sovereignty bargains are likely occurring.
States may view sovereignty as an inherent right. Within this right of sovereignty
is the right to decide how they will deal with environmental issues. But "while
sovereignty suggests that states have authority and control over their own territories,
those territories themselves are part and parcel of the global ecosystem and cannot be
violated in any meaningful fashion" (Liftin, 277). In other words, the logic of sovereignty
goes out the window when it comes to environmental issues and states are expected to
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adjust accordingly. This does not mean, however, that all states will respond with the
same level of enthusiasm and responsibility. Thus, "the challenge for states is how to
appropriate understandings and practices that reconcile the seeming mismatch between
territoriality and ecological protection" (Liftin, 277)
Because of the nature of MEAs, the traditional view of sovereignty is slowly
changing. The parties to these agreements will have to relinquish some sovereignty in
order for them to be successfully implemented. Faure and Lefevere refer to this as the
"new approach to sovereignty. States are no longer seen as completely sovereign entities
but have to accept limitations on their originally sovereign rights for the benefit of the
environment, future generations, or the international community as a whole" (Vig and
Axelrod, 140). One problem is that not all parties approach environmental problems with
the same level of enthusiasm. In many cases “cooperation is greatly affected by wide-
ranging differences over what the major problems are, who caused them and who will
pay to resolve them. Priorities as seen in the industrialized world are not invariably
supported by the poorer countries and versa” (Piddington, 19). The notion of self-interest
of the state will have to be reconciled with the collective good of the international
community.
Collective Action
Collective action in general terms is the pursuit of a goal or set of goals by more
than one person. Transboundary environmental problems are collective action problems
on a global level and “organizing collective action at a worldwide scale to address
transboundary pollution spillovers and to manage the shared resources of the global
natural commons represents a major challenge” (Esty, 2). Getting countries to cooperate
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on environmental issues is a double edge sword. On the one hand, countries do not want
to do anything to interfere with national self-interest. On the other, transboundary
environmental problems require a global response and
“individual countries cannot manage the resource or limit the harm acting on their
own. Protecting shared natural resources and preventing environmental spillovers
at a global scale only makes sense in the context of a shared sense of destiny –
countries moving together as a ‘community’ to address common threats” (Esty,
3).
According to Hurrell and Kingsbury, "collective environmental management
poses a severe, and therefore politically sensitive, challenge because it involves the
creation of rules and institutions that embody notions of shared duties, that impinge
heavily on the domestic structures and organizations of states, that invest individuals and
groups within states with rights and duties, and that seek to embody some notion of a
common good for the planet as a whole" (Hurrell & Kingsbury, 6-7). This is a tricky
issue because once again countries are being asked to give something up in order to
promote the common good. The focus is not on how the problem affects the individual
but rather how it affects the country, the continent, the world, or the planet as a whole.
MEAs seek to address the issue of what is best for the common good through collective
action.
Based on the paper interview results it seems parties are willing to relinquish
some sovereignty in order to pursue the greater good. But what is the "greater good"?
This may be answered differently by different parties. The perception of what constitutes
the greater good may influence the level of obligation a state feels to fix the problem.
Edith Brown Weiss points out that, "traditionally only areas not subject to national
jurisdiction have been considered a global commons. But from the intergenerational
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perspective, the planet is a 'global commons' shared by all generations... there is a
planetary trust by which we are all bound, which gives us certain rights and obligations"
(Liftin, 193).
A phrase often associated with the environment issues is the “tragedy of the
commons”. The phrase comes from an article by the same title that was written by Garrett
Hardin in 1968. Hardin’s concept of the tragedy of the commons is perhaps one of the
most pervasive in environmental studies today and as one author says, “Hardin’s
conclusion in the “Tragedy of the Commons” has been accorded by some the status of
scientific law. The tragedy of the commons has become part of the conventional wisdom
in environmental studies, resource science and policy, economics, ecology, political
science and is featured in textbooks. It has also been used in formulating resource-
management policy” (Conca and Debalko, 56).
Hardin relates the story of an open pasture used by several farmers to make his
argument for the tragedy of the commons. Each herdsman wants to maximize his own
gain and continues to add cattle, first one, and then another and then another to the
commons. In the beginning this arrangement may work but eventually, “comes the day of
reckoning. The day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At
this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy” (Conca
and Debalko, 40). The result is too many cattle and not enough land. A resource that
once seemed limitless, has now reached its limits. And “therein is the tragedy. Each man
is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a
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commons brings ruin to all” (Conca and Debalko, 41).
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons has been an enduring concept in the literature
on environmental studies and was revisited not long ago by Elinor Ostrom in her 1990
book, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. In
Ostrom’s analysis of managing natural resources, she begins with an analysis of Hardin’s
model of the tragedy of the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma game, and Mancur Olson’s
logic of collective action. As Ostrom points out, these three models tend to be the most
commonly used to develop policy prescriptions for managing natural resources.
Ostrom’s book centers on common-pool resources. Common-pool resources or
CPR refer to a natural or manmade resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it
costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use (Ostrom,
30). Ostrom is concerned with how these resources are managed and governed by
individuals who jointly share these resources. She uses the three models as a starting
point for her own research and says that “these models are extremely useful for
explaining how perfectly rational individuals can produce, under some circumstances,
outcomes that are not ‘rational’ when viewed from the perspective of all those involved”
(Ostrom, 6). She continues, however, to argue that by relying too heavily on only one of
the three original models, those attempting to use these models as the basis for policy
prescription frequently achieved little more than a metaphorical use of the models.
(Ostrom, 6-7). Ostrom's point is that these models, although good, have limited
explanatory capabilities. Because of this limitation, policy analysis may become flawed
and may not accurately predict policy results. According to Ostrom, "many observers
have come to assume most resources are like those specified in the three models. As
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such, it has been assumed that the individuals have been caught in a grim trap. The
resulting policy recommendations have had an equally grim character" (Ostrom, 8).
Ostrom does not dismiss the usefulness of the three models. Rather, she points out
the limitations of each and the danger of taking them at face value. According to Ostrom:
“what makes these models so interesting and so powerful is that they capture
important aspects of many different problems that occur in diverse settings in all
parts of the world. What makes these models so dangerous – when they are used
metaphorically as the foundation for policy – is that the constraints that are
assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis are taken on faith as being fixed in
empirical settings, unless external authorities change them” (Ostrom, 6-7).
Environmental situations, in Ostrom's case common-pool-resources, require a more in-
depth analysis than these models can provide.
The basic problem that Ostrom examines in her book is how to collectively
manage shared resources. She writes, "the central question in this study is how a group of
principals who are in an interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to
obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise
act opportunistically" (Ostrom, 29). If the three most common models used do not
effectively address these problems, then what model can? In answer to this question,
Ostrom does not offer a new theory of collective action (although she does believe one is
needed). Instead she offers an alternative framework upon which to build in future
research. This framework is based upon the notion of cooperation. Common pool
resources are often overexploited and misused by individuals acting in their own self-
interests. Traditional solutions to this problem involved either governmental regulation or
privatization. These solutions left the actual users of the resources out of the loop which
Ostrom believes leads to bad policy. A better approach, according to Ostrom, is to create
cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users
49
themselves.
This in essence is what MEAs are doing. The treaties are creating institutions that
are meant to cooperate amongst themselves and with others outside of the treaty to
develop solutions to today's environmental problems. Much of what is done in terms of
compliance with and implementation of MEAs is done on a voluntary basis by the parties
to the treaties. For the most part, there are no heavy-handed government regulations that
force countries to comply with or implement MEAs. Some treaties do not even provide
for dispute resolution. Implementation guidelines are spelled out in the treaties and
countries are encouraged to comply but as previously stated, only in rare cases are
countries forced to comply with things such as sanctions. The International Court of
Justice is always a last resort measure for dispute resolution.
Ostrom concludes by saying that the three models are not wrong, only limited in
their explanatory capability. She calls them “special models that utilize extreme
assumptions rather than general theories” (Ostrom, 183). These models look at situations
being the extreme rather than the norm. Louis Weschler says that:
“Ostrom rightly shows that conventional approaches to CPRs assume the most
extreme and unlikely situations. Their range is limited. Worst of all from
Ostrom’s perspective, the conventional models miss the smaller scale CPRs that
are the focus of her inquiry and that may well be the more common experience”
(Weschler, 491).
Her solution is further theoretical development to help build “a general
framework that can help to direct analysts’ attention to important variables to be taken
into account in empirical and theoretical work” (Ostrom, 183). Even if you disagree with
Ostrom's solution to the problems with these three models, the importance of her work
cannot be overlooked. Her analysis tells us that we need to look outside of the "box" in
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policy analysis. This is always good advice for the policy analyst. There are many models
and theories in policy research today. Few, if any, ever fully explain anything.
MEAs involve collective action problems on a very large scale. The temptation to
"free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically" is ever present. According to Esty,
“In a global marketplace, countries face economic incentives to ‘free ride’ on the
environmental efforts of others. Any nation that disregards transboundary
problems and ducks its share of the burden of a global policy intervention can
reduce the pollution control costs borne by its own industries. In doing so, the
shirking nation may improve the competitive position of its companies in
international markets. But when some nations choose this path, others may
respond by declining to carry out their share of international environmental
obligations. The commitment to cooperation quickly unravels, leaving global-
scale problems unabated. This ‘lose-lose’ dynamic leads to a ‘tragedy of the
commons.’ Without international cooperation on management of the shared
resources of the global natural commons in a sustainable fashion, we risk
overexploiting resources and permitting pollution spillovers that might be
individually rational (from a single nation’s comparison of costs and benefits) but
which are collectively damaging when viewed from a worldwide perspective”
(Esty, 3).
Again using the Kyoto Protocol as an example, despite not abiding by its original
signature, the US will benefit from the ratification and enaction of the treaty, as will any
other country that opts not to ratify. The trick is to offer the parties some other benefits
that make it worthwhile for them to abide by the treaties.
Hardin’s concept once again appears in the recent literature on global climate
change. Once again we are dealing with a resource that may at first seem limitless but in
reality has definite limits. This is an issue addressed by Luterbacher and Sprinz in their
study, International Relations and Global Climate Change. According to these authors,
“global climate change raises the issue of the relationship between the general use of
resources by human populations and the ultimate limits of this use” (Luterbacher and
Sprinz, 9). They add that Hardin’s tragedy of the commons could “be a useful way to
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think about the barriers hindering the international community from initiating actions on
global climate change” (Luterbacher and Sprinz, 9).
Like Elinor Ostrom, though, they see the limits of Hardin’s model when
explaining the global climate change problem. Ian Rowlands is one of the contributing
authors to Luterbacher and Sprinz’s book. According to Rowlands, “some have imagined
the global climate change challenge as akin to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ but it may not
actually be accurately represented as a global tragedy of the commons” (Luterbacher and
Sprinz, 56). Rowlands comes to this conclusion because he says that motivation to
endorse climate change policies varies depending on the costs or benefits of abatement.
This, in turn, leads countries to adopt different strategies. Thus, he says, “a paradigm case
of a tragedy may not be occurring, for ‘ruin [may not be] the destination toward which all
men rush’ and ‘freedom in a commons [may not bring] tragedy to all’ ” (Luterbacher and
Sprinz, 56).
Despite its shortcomings, Hardin’s tragedy of the commons does have a place in
both the climate change challenge as well as all international environmental agreements.
Deforestation, increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere, and dumping of hazardous
wastes in our oceans are all examples of moves toward a “tragedy of the commons” at its
most basic level. But international agreements meant to address these issues become
increasingly more complex than the problem of simply “overgrazing”. Therefore, the
solutions also need to be more complex. One of the major points of Ostrom’s book is that
traditional solutions are not always the answer. Regulation alone will not solve
environmental problems. As Ostrom concludes, “if this study does nothing more than
shatter the convictions of many policy analysts that the only way to solve CPR problems
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is for external authorities to impose full private property rights or centralized regulation,
it will have accomplished one major purpose” (Ostrom, 182).
How far will states go to protect the commons? The territorial exclusivity upon
which state sovereignty is premised appears to be fundamentally violated by
transboundary environmental problems and the logic of collective action suggests that
sovereign states will be highly reluctant to engage in the kind of cooperative endeavors
required for environmental protection (Liftin, 168). Are states strictly self-serving
entities? The mere fact that today there are more than 900 international legal instruments
related to the environment would seem to indicate otherwise. The fact that states are
willing to be parties to multilateral environmental agreements does indicate that states are
concerned about certain environmental issues. Whether this concern is motivated by
politics, money, or a genuine desire to fix the problem is difficult to say. The end result
though is that states are willing to accept some responsibility for the problem.
What does motivate states to act? As Mancur Olson points out,
"there is obviously no purpose in having an organization when individual,
unorganized action can serve the interests of the individual as well as or better
than an organization. But when a number of individuals have a common or
collective interest - when they share a single purpose or objective - individual or
unorganized action will either not be able to advance that common interest at all,
or will not be able to advance that interest adequately. Organizations can therefore
perform a function when there are common or group interests, and though
organizations often serve purely personal, individual interests, their characteristic
and primary function is to advance the common interests of groups of individuals"
(Olson, 7).
With the onset of so many transboundary environmental problems, states are
realizing that individual solutions will not solve these problems. The fact that a state did
not help create the problem does not prevent it from spreading across borders. Nor should
that preclude a state from being a part of the solution. The effects of transboundary
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environmental problems are far-reaching. In April 1986, one of the four reactors at the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded releasing radioactive material into the air. The
accident killed 30 people and produced high radiation levels within a 20 mile radius of
the accident. Although “most of the released material was deposited close by as dust and
debris, the lighter material was carried by wind over the Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and to
some extent over Scandinavia and Europe” (Uranium Information Center, 2006). People
who had never heard of Chernobyl were feeling its effects. Acid rain presents a similar
problem. Wind can carry pollutants hundreds of miles away before they join water to
form acid rain. A plant in Illinois may produce sulfur dioxide that forms acid rain over
Massachusetts. States and countries are not immune from transboundary environmental
problems simply because they did not contribute to them.
By the same token, the benefits received from the solution to the problem are just
as far reaching. Signing onto an MEA does not obligate a state to actually implement it
but even those states that do not implement the agreement will benefit from those that do.
As Olson points out, "the very fact that a goal or purpose is common to a group means
that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its
achievement" (Olson, 15).
These benefits, however, do not come without cost. Olson says that although all
members have a common interest in obtaining the collective benefit, they have no
common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good (Olson, 21). Olson is
referring to monetary costs but in the case of MEAs, the costs involve more than just
money. For states, part of the cost for cleaning up environmental problems may be
relinquishing some level of sovereignty.
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The Challenge of the Global Commons
The global commons present new challenges for collective action. The major
drawback of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons and Ostrom’s “CPRs” is that they deal
with small-scale local and regional problems. Global challenges require a global response
including establishing “global institutions to manage biodiversity, climate change, and
other ecosystem services (Ostrom, et al, 281). Ostrom, et al, list six reasons that make
these new challenges especially difficult:
1) the scaling-up problem: having more participants increases the difficulty of
organizing, agreeing on rules, and enforcing rules and global environmental
resources now involve 6 billion inhabitants of the globe.
2) Cultural diversity challenge: cultural diversity can increase decrease the
likelihood of finding shared interests and understandings. The problem is
exacerbated by ‘north-south’ conflicts stemming from economic differences
between industrialized and less-industrialized countries;
3) Complications of interlinked CPRs: As we address global issues, we face
greater interactions between global systems. From our increasingly
specialized understandings and particular points on the globe, it is difficult to
comprehend the significance of global CPRs and how we need to work
together to govern these resources successfully;
4) Accelerating rates of change: Population growth, economic development,
capital and labor mobility, and technological change push us past
environmental thresholds before we know it;
5) Requirement of unanimous agreement as a collective-choice rule: The basic
collective-choice rule for global resource management is voluntary assent to
negotiated treaties. This allows some national governments to hold out for
special privileges before they join others in order to achieve regulation, thus
strongly affecting the kinds of resource management policies that can be
adopted at this level;
6) We have only one globe with which to experiment: historically, people could
migrate to other resources if they made a major error in managing a local
CPR. At the global level, there is no place to move.
(Ostrom, et al, 281-282).
Conclusions
Both sovereignty and the issue of collective action have the potential to cause
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problems for successful implementation. In terms of sovereignty, parties may need to be
convinced to give up some of their sovereignty in order to protect the environment.
Parties may be willing to give up some sovereignty for the "greater" good. There is a
limit to the Earth's natural resources and the responsibility for preserving these resources
often falls on the international community in the form of MEAs. What these agreements
try to do is strike a balance between a country's desire to preserve its sovereignty and a
desire to help protect the environment. This is no easy task and it adds to the challenge of
implementation of such agreements. The four MEAs in this study seem to have met that
challenge and done so fairly successfully. The Parties to these MEAs seem to be aware
that environmental resources are limited and are willing to cooperate to preserve these
resources. More importantly, sovereignty and collective action can also be considered as
part of the institutional framework of the MEA itself.
Inherent to all MEAs is the possibility of free-riding, shirking responsibilities, and
acting opportunistically. Parties that do not sign on or ratify will still reap the benefits of
the MEA. But consider this; there are 191 member states of the United Nations. The
number of parties signed on to each of the MEAs in this study break down as follows:
Ramsar - 145, CBD - 176, MP - 189, and the UNCCD - 191. Signing on to an MEA is
voluntary and those that sign on are aware of their obligations when they do so. A review
of the National Reports used in this study gives no indication of free-riding, shirking, or
acting opportunistically (at least in terms of the data available in English). The countries
that are parties to these agreements seem to take their responsibilities seriously and do
what they can to live up to them. Based on the paper interview responses, there is no
evidence to indicate free-riding, shirking, or acting opportunistically is occurring in these
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MEAs. In responses to the paper interview question relating to capacity and intent of
parties, all four MEAs said that parties have the intent to comply but lack the capacity to
do so. None said they had the capacity but not the intent.
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Chapter IV: Case Selection Criteria
All of the MEAs selected for this study have been entered into force for at least 10
years and have an established record for implementation, monitoring, and/ or compliance.
They are all considered major treaties and have a large number of contracting parties.
They all have at least one year’s worth of National Reports for evaluation. The Montreal
Protocol (MP) was selected specifically because of its known track record for being one
of the most effective MEAs in force today. It was believed that this would provide a good
basis for comparison with the other MEAs about which very little was known.
The MEAs
1) Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987): The MP
opened for signature on 16 September 1987 and entered into force on 1 January 1989. As
of October 2004, 189 parties had ratified the Vienna Convention, 188 had ratified the
MP, 175 had ratified the London Amendment, 164 had ratified the Copenhagen
Amendment, 120 had ratified the Montreal Amendment, and 82 had ratified the Beijing
Amendment (UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/4). The Montreal Protocol is one of the international
environmental accords to which members most universally adhere . One hundred and
eighty-nine countries are party to it.
Implementation: States have been unusually aggressive and effective in implementing
the Montreal Protocol. A regime was established to address issues of noncompliance that
includes the Implementation Committee of ten states and specific noncompliance
procedures.
Structure: There are two separate secretariats, one for the protocol and one for the
Montreal Protocol Fund. The secretariat plays an important role in facilitating compliance
58
with the Protocol. The Implementation Committee reviews reports submitted by the
parties and addresses the possible violations of targets and timetable obligations.
Dispute Resolution: The Montreal Protocol contains an elaborate article on the
settlement of disputes involving its interpretation or application. Differences are resolved
through negotiation. If that is unsuccessful, parties need to involve a third party. States
can also agree at the time of ratification to accept compulsory dispute settlement
procedures of arbitration or referral to the International Court of Justice (this has never
been invoked). (Source: Weiss and Jacobson, 135-157)
2) Convention on Biological Diversity (1992): The CBD opened for signature on 5 June
1992 and entered into force on 29 December 1993; 176 countries have ratified it and 6
have signed but not ratified. It is one of the most extensive international agreements ever
reached. CBD has three overall objectives: (1) conservation of biological diversity, (2)
sustainable use of the components of diversity, and (3) fair and equitable sharing of the
benefit that can be derived from genetic resources.
Implementation: Implementation is the responsibility of the Conference of the Parties
(COP). Each party is responsible for submitting reports on measures that it has taken for
the implementation of the provisions of this convention and their effectiveness in meeting
the objectives of this convention.
Structure: The Secretariat is responsible for arranging and servicing meetings of the
COPs. The COPs are responsible for implementation, reviewing reports, and adopting
protocols and amendments. The COP is the highest decision-making forum of the
convention. The Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice
(SBSTTA) provides timely advice relating to the implementation of the convention.
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Dispute Resolution: This involves negotiation first. If negotiation fails, parties may
jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third party. If both measures
fail, the parties may submit to arbitration or submission of dispute to the International
Court of Justice.
(Source:http://www.internat.naturvardsverket.se/documents/nature/biodiv/biodiv.ht
m and the text of The Convention on Biological Diversity)
3) The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (1994): The UNCCD
was adopted on 17 June 1994 and opened for signature from October 1994 to October
1995. It entered into force on 26 December 1996 and currently has 179 contracting
parties. The objective of the Convention is to combat desertification, particularly in
Africa, through effective action at all levels, supported by international cooperation and
partnership arrangements in the framework of an integrated approach which is consistent
with Agenda 21, with a view to contributing to the achievement of sustainable
development in affected areas (UNCCD text).
Implementation: The Parties work closely together in the implementation of action
programmes. Implementation is overseen by the Committee for the Review of the
Implementation of the Convention (CRIC). The CRIC is a subsidiary body of the COP.
Structure: The COP is the supreme body of the Convention. It makes all decisions
(within its mandate) necessary to promote its effective implementation. The Secretariat
makes arrangements for meetings of the COPs and other subsidiary body established
under the convention, and provides them with services as required. The Committee on
Science and Technology provides the COP with information and advice on scientific and
technological matters relating to combating desertification and mitigating the effects of
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drought.
Dispute Resolution: The Parties are responsible for settling disputes among themselves
through negotiation or other peaceful means. (Source: www.unccd.int/convention)
4) Ramsar (1971): Ramsar was adopted on 2 February 1971. It entered into force in
1975 and has 145 contracting parties. The official name of the treaty is the Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance especially for Waterfowl Habitat. The original
emphasis of the Convention was on conservation and wide use of wetlands primarily to
provide habitat for water birds (Ramsar). The Convention has since broadened its scope
to cover all aspects of wetland conservation and wise use. The Convention is now
commonly referred to as the Convention on Wetlands or simply Ramsar (the city in Iran
where is it was adopted).
Implementation: Implementation is a partnership between the Contracting Parties, the
Standing Committee, and the Convention Secretariat, with the advice of the Scientific
and Technical Review Panel (STRP) and the support of the International Organization of
Partners.
Structure: The Conference of the Contracting Parties (COP) is the policy making organ
of the convention. As such, it reviews the general trends in the implementation of the
Convention as reflected in the national reports and adopts decisions to improve the way
in which the convention works. The COPs of Ramsar are known to be highly effective
and allow active participation by the non-governmental and academic community. There
is also a Standing Committee, a Secretariat which carries out day-to-day activities,
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), and International Organization Partners
(both IGOs and NGOs) which contribute on a regular basis.
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Dispute Resolution: Ramsar has not established any formal procedure for dispute
resolution but based on the language of the Convention the most likely candidate for
handling dispute resolution would be the COPs. (Source: www.Ramsar.org)
Data Collection
The study is based on data collected from a paper interview completed by
representatives of the four MEAs mentioned above. The respondents included a legal
advisor for the CBD, the Deputy Executive Secretary for the Ozone Secretariat of the
MP, a communications officer for the Ramsar Convention Secretariat, and an associate
public information officer for the UNCCD. Two sets of paper interviews were sent out.
The first group was mailed in November of 2003 to the World Heritage Convention, The
Montreal Protocol, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.
Only one response was received from this group from the MP. A second group of paper
interviews was sent out in January of 2004. This second group included the CBD, the
International Tropical Timber Agreement, the London Convention of 1972, the UNCCD,
and Ramsar. Three additional paper interviews from the CBD, the UNCCD, and Ramsar
were received from this second group. A response was also received from the London
Convention but the respondent indicated that most questions on the paper interview were
not applicable to his MEA so there was no usable data from this paper interview.
The second source of data for the study was the National Reports submitted by the
parties. The frequency of reporting is spelled out in each MEA. The most recent National
Reports available were used and were found online on the websites for each of the four
MEAs used in this study. National Reports are not all in the same format therefore the
type of information taken from each varies. Statistical data was taken from the CBD,
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Ramsar, and the MP National Reports. For the UNCCD, a more qualitative approach was
taken. Only those questions or information relevant to implementation, monitoring,
compliance, and resources were used. Of the ones used for this study, the most complete
information came from the CBD. The CBD National Reports are designed more like a
survey and are more quantitative in nature. Most of the statistical data in this study came
from the CBD National Reports. The National Reports from the UNCCD tend to give the
details of implementation, monitoring and compliance with words rather than with
information that lends itself to statistical analysis. The actual National Reports for the MP
were not used; however, the MP provides summaries of progress which provided
information regarding implementation, monitoring, and compliance. Table 4.1 gives a
breakdown of the National Reports used.
TABLE 4.1
NATIONAL REPORTS USED FOR ANALYSIS
Year of
Reports
Number
Submitted
Number
Used
Number of
Developed
Countries
Number of
Developing
Countries
1. CBD 2005 56 54 15 39
2. UNCCD 2004 78 38 15 23
3. RAMSAR 2002 116 116 22 94
4. MP 2004 156 156 38 118
1. Of the 56 countries reporting data for 2005, two reports were not used because they
were in Arabic.
2. Of the 78 reports submitted for 2004, 40 were not used: 28 were in French, two were in
Spanish, one was in Arabic, and nine countries did not report for 2004.
3. Information on implementation, monitoring, and compliance taken from the COP8
Global Statistics; an analysis of the COP8 National Reports.
4. The actual reports were not used for the MP. A summary of the data was taken from
UNEP/OzL.Pro.156/4: Report of the Secretariat on data and consideration of compliance
issues, 22-26 November 2004.
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Within the context of the four MEAs, the interaction between the parties and the
implementing institutions are examined to determine the effectiveness of implementation,
monitoring, and compliance of the MEAs. The secondary data from the National Reports
is used to supplement the primary paper interview results. Because there were only four
cases used in this study, the National Reports will offer more specific details regarding
the responses received on the paper interviews. The data from the National Reports will
also help to verify responses on the interviews; does the reality of the reports match up
with the perceptions of those responsible for completing the paper interviews?
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Chapter V: Research Design and Data Analysis
The previous chapters in this research have examined the relationship among
implementation, monitoring, and compliance as it relates to the effectiveness of
multilateral environmental agreements. The findings presented in these chapters support
the view of this study that compliance is a measure of effectiveness of MEAs. The
limited number of cases used in this study limits the ability of it to make any broad
generalizations regarding these three processes but it can serve as a starting point for
future research in this area and give some indication of the direction that future research
should take. This is true particularly in the role institutions play in implementation,
monitoring, and compliance and the importance of looking at institutions from a
historical perspective.
Summary of Research Design
This study relied primarily on four paper interviews received from the Convention
on Biological Diversity, the Montreal Protocol, the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification, and the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar). Because of the
limited number of cases used, additional data was necessary to support these findings.
For this reason, data taken from the National Reports of each MEA was used as
secondary data. The four original paper interviews were collected over a period of four
months. The four MEAs deal with four different environmental problems but are all
closely related. The primary responsibility of the CBD is biological diversity. The MP
deals with controlling ozone depletion and preserving the ozone layer. The UNCCD is
working towards controlling desertification primarily in African Nations. Finally, Ramsar
is concerned with wetland preservation. The MP is known for being a “model” MEA. It
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has been extremely successful with implementation, monitoring, and compliance.
The four MEAs were studied within the framework of historical institutionalism
to determine the role institutions play in implementation, monitoring, compliance, and,
ultimately, the effectiveness of the MEA. Each MEA provides an institutional framework
in which to address implementation, monitoring, and compliance. Some agreements are
more specific than others but all provide at least a basic outline. The issues of collective
action, sovereignty, and resources were also taken into consideration within this same
context. The study looked at the role each of these, if any, plays in implementation,
monitoring, and compliance.
Summary of Paper Interview Findings
Although the results on the paper interviews do not allow for extensive
generalizations regarding MEAs, they do provide some interesting and useful information
regarding the four MEAs used in this study.
Implementation
When asked to rate the success of implementation the respondents for the CBD,
UNCCD, and the MP, all selected “successful.” The Ramsar respondent selected
“somewhat successful.” Implementation is taking place in all four MEAs but they appear
to be in different stages. The most complete example of implementation is the MP. With
specific guidelines in place, including the creation of the MLF, the MP has an established
record of implementation. It also has one of the most successful records of
implementation. Numerical standards and limits for ozone depleting substances have
been set and countries are required to take the necessary steps to see that those standards
and limits are met. The language of the Protocol is very specific about acceptable levels
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of CFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, hydro chlorofluorocarbons,
hydrobromofluorocarbons, methyl bromide, and bromochloromethane and how these
acceptable levels are going to be achieved. Of the four MEAs in this study, the MP has
the one with the most specific language in terms of what it is that is being monitored.
How to implement the changes to meet these requirements is not specifically spelled out
but the time frame for achieving these goals is. And parties to the MP are expected to
meet the deadlines set or have an explanation for not doing so. The extensive reporting
that is required of the parties to the MP help ensure that implementation is taking place.
Implementation of the CBD is also taking place but faces a number of challenges.
In the National Reports, the parties indicated that in all cases challenges to
implementation were either high or medium. Very few responded that the challenge has
been successfully overcome. The low numbers indicate that parties are not meeting these
challenges successfully. This is a problem for implementation. For an MEA to be
effective, the challenges of implementation must be successfully overcome. Despite
characterizing its implementation as “successful” the CBD has some problems to
overcome when it comes to implementation. The effort seems to be there on the part of
the parties but the challenges they face when it comes to implementation are great based
on the data in the National Reports.
The UNCCD also chose “successful” to characterize implementation. Based on
information from the National Reports, it is more likely that “successful” characterizes
implementation at the party level rather than at the MEA level. Unlike the other MEAs,
the UNCCD serves more as a facilitating agency for implementation. Each party to the
Convention is responsible for developing a separate framework (the NAP) for
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implementing the Convention locally. This involves setting up an entirely separate
institutional framework for implementation. Implementation takes place at two levels;
within the framework of the NAP and within the framework of the UNCCD. Although a
high percentage of projects have been implemented within the framework of the NAP
only 37% have been implemented within the framework of the UNCCD. At the party
level there is success with implementation but this success has not yet translated to the
MEA level.
The UNCCD is also unlike the other MEAs in that developing and developed
parties have different obligations when it comes to implementation. While it is the
responsibility of the developing parties to create the NAPs which will establish the
guidelines for and institutions responsible for implementation, it is the responsibility of
the developed countries to provide the financial and technical resources to assist in
implementation. Since desertification is generally not a problem in developed countries,
they assist those parties most at risk. This reliance on developed parties to supply the
resources necessary for implementation can be a hindrance to implementation if these
resources are too little or do not come at all. The National Reports seem to indicate that
most parties are in the early stages of implementation but are making progress none-the-
less.
Ramsar was the only respondent to characterize implementation as “somewhat
successful.” Although the Ramsar National Reports are not as clear as some of the others,
there is an indication in the responses that implementation is slow in coming. The Ramsar
National Reports divide the responses into two categories: PCTYES, percent of
contracting parties answering YES, and PCTPRG, percent of contracting parties
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answering YES, or PARTLY, or IN PROGRESS. The second category is not very
specific and leaves a great deal of room for interpretation. This is the category where
most responses to the questions of implementation fell. This could explain Ramsar’s
“somewhat successful” response. Parties are obviously making some progress but to what
extent is unclear based on the Reports. The lower percentages in the PCT YES category
may be a better indication that there are currently some problems with implementation.
Monitoring
In the section on monitoring, the respondents were asked, “How would you rate
the success of monitoring for your MEA?” The respondents from the UNCCD and the
MP said “very successful.” The respondent from Ramsar said “somewhat successful.”
The respondent from the CBD said “not very successful.” The “very successful” answer
from the MP respondent is not surprising. Of the four MEAs in this study, the MP has the
most advanced and organized systems for monitoring compliance. The MP respondent
also answered “very frequently” when asked, “How frequently do you monitor
compliance?” Again, this is not a surprising response. The MP collects reports from
parties once a year and will request follow-up reports if parties are found to be in
noncompliance. Lapses must be explained and they must be explained satisfactorily.
Noncompliance issues are also expected to be corrected. The MP stays on top of the
situation to see that it is resolved quickly.
A review of the UNCCD National Reports shows that most parties do not
currently have a formal system in place for monitoring but all are working towards that
goal. For this reason, the UNCCD respondent’s answer is a bit of a surprise. Because
each party has at least a plan for monitoring, the respondent may believe this makes
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monitoring a success. Of all the MEAs in this study, the UNCCD has the farthest to go in
terms of monitoring.
The text of Ramsar makes provisions for reporting problems but it may be that
this is not done in any systematic way. Since the Ramsar respondent answered
“somewhat successful” and “infrequently” to the monitoring questions there is an
indication that there are problems with monitoring.
The CBD respondent rated the success of its monitoring as “not very successful”
and did not even respond to the frequency question so this obviously indicates some
problems with monitoring of the CBD. The National Reports of the CBD indicated that
monitoring systems are in place and that parties give monitoring high priority. The reason
for the discrepancy between the National Reports and the CBD respondent’s answers is
unclear. It may be that despite the fact that systems are in place and parties give
monitoring high priority, the system simply does not work as it should.
Institutions
Agreements adopted after 1972 “generally have the following institutional
elements: a COP, a secretariat, advisory bodies, a clearing-house mechanism, and a
financial mechanism” (UNEP, 2001). In the four MEAs, compliance is handled by a
variety of institutions. The responsibility for compliance with the MP falls to the
Secretariat and the Implementation Committee. Compliance with Ramsar is the
responsibility of the Secretariat and the COPs. Under the CBD and the UNCCD, this
responsibility falls to the COPs. NGOs, IGOs, Scientific and Technical Bodies, and
Private Sector Organizations also play a role in implementation, monitoring, and
compliance. One or more of the respondents selected at least one of these institutions as
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playing a role in implementation, monitoring, and compliance (The MP respondent did
not answer this question so the responses discussed are from the respondents of the CBD,
the UNCCD, and Ramsar). Although the level of influence varies, all the institutions
named in these questions are involved in the process. As the number of MEAs grow it is
expected that the involvement of these institutions, particularly NGOs, will also grow.
The support of NGOs is especially important for the CBD, the UNCCD, and Ramsar
where support at the national and local levels is crucial to successful implementation.
Both the CBD and the UNCCD have specific language in their texts to address this issue.
NGOs are not as important to the MP because it has the MLF and the ImpCom to assist
with implementation. The MLF provides a source of funding to assist with
implementation whereas the other three agreements lack this kind of source. A lack of
resources is an area where increased involvement of NGO’s can be very helpful.
The Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements says this about institutional framework:
“States should consider an institutional framework that promotes designation of
responsibilities to agencies for: (1) enforcement of laws and regulations, (2)
monitoring and evaluation of implementation, (3) collection, reporting, and
analysis of data, including its qualitative and quantitative verification and
provision of information about investigations, (4) awareness raising and publicity,
in particular for the regulated community, and education for the general public,
and (5) assistance to courts, tribunals and other related agencies, where
appropriate, which may be supported by relevant information and data”
(Guidelines on Compliance, 9).
When parties first meet in the negotiation phase of the treaty, they already have a set of
guidelines to help them develop the institutional framework for the MEA. It is not
something that is approached haphazardly. There is a purpose and intent to every decision
made by the parties when developing the structure of the MEA. There is some flexibility
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but the guidelines help to maintain some consistency in institutional structures within and
across MEAs. Where the power lies in the institutional structure is up to those negotiating
the treaty, hence the flexibility mentioned earlier.
The responses to these questions demonstrate that the institutional framework of
MEAs cannot and should not be viewed as taking a strictly top down or bottom up
approach to implementation, monitoring, and compliance. The MEAs in this study seem
to fall somewhere in-between. Even the UNCCD, which uses a bottom up approach at the
party level, uses more of a mixed approach at the MEA level. Based on the paper
interview results, NGOs, IGOs, Scientific and/or Technical Bodies, and Private Sector
Organizations can also play a part in implementation, monitoring and compliance. The
level of influence varies but this does not diminish the importance of these groups.
It is not enough, though, to simply have the institutional framework in place.
Problems with monitoring and compliance may arise if the institutional structure of the
MEA proves to be weak. Inadequate budgets, a shortage of trained staff, and competition
among institutions can all lead to weaknesses. Involving the public in the decision-
making process can help to minimize such weaknesses. This is where the importance of
NGOs comes in. Recently:
“NGOs have emerged as major players and partners at local, national, and
regional levels in development and conservation activities, performing a multitude
of roles including environmental education and awareness-raising among the
public. NGOs have assisted in the design and implementation of environmental
policies, programmes, and action plans, as well as setting out specifications for
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)…Many studies have noted the
importance of NGOs in monitoring state behaviour and promoting compliance of
MEAs” (GEO-2000, 213).
This is a relationship that needs to be cultivated by MEAs to ensure successful
implementation by helping to maintain a system of monitoring thus improving
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compliance. This in turn should improve the overall effectiveness of the MEAs. In
Compliance
The responses to the compliance questions indicate that all four MEAs in this
study use a management approach, or what is sometimes called a sunshine approach, to
compliance. The question on the paper interview asked, “what method or methods does
your MEA employ to gain compliance from the parties to the treaty?” The choices here
were: (1) financial incentives, (2) formal regulation, (3) formal punishments, and (4)
reporting. The CBD, UNCCD, and Ramsar respondents all chose reporting. Although the
MP respondent did not specifically respond to this question, he indicated elsewhere on
the paper interview that it also uses reporting. No where on the paper interview did any of
the respondents indicate that they use formal regulations or punishments to gain
compliance. Again, the MP respondent did not specifically answer this question but he
did say the MP uses financial incentives in the form of the MLF to assist in
implementation, monitoring, and compliance but there is no indication that funds are
withheld for non-compliance. The MP respondent also said that those countries that are
financially compensated for compliance are more compliant but did not say anything
about non-compliance being due to withholding of funds.
Sovereignty
To see if sovereignty was a problem with MEAs, the paper interview respondents
were asked specific questions about sovereignty. When asked if they saw multilateral
environmental agreements as being inherently at odds with sovereignty all four
respondents said no. The CBD did add the comment that through MEAs States cede some
amount of sovereign authority. This statement coincides with Article 3 of the CBD text
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which states that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (CBD). The MP added
the comment that all decisions are taken at the Meeting of the Parties by consensus.
These responses indicate there is no direct conflict between sovereignty and these MEAs.
MEAs can exist without trampling on a parties right to sovereignty and all parties signing
these agreements know what they may or may not be giving up. All MEAs are voluntary
agreements and no country is forced to sign. This is not to say there is no pressure to sign
but every party has the right to simply say no.
The respondents were also asked if they felt that some level of sovereignty must
be relinquished in order for MEAs to be successfully implemented. The respondents for
the CBD, the UNCCD, and Ramsar all said, “no.” The MP respondent said yes which
would seem to indicate that there is some level of negotiation that goes on at the Meeting
of the Parties in order to get consensus. Some decisions must require the Parties to give a
little so that a consensus must be reached. Considering the success of the MP though, this
does not hinder implementation, monitoring, and compliance. When it comes to
environmental agreements parties seem to be willing to make concessions, including
ceding some level of sovereignty if it means things like clean air or water.
The responses given on the paper interview seem to coincide with Liftin’s idea of
sovereignty bargains. The responses and additional comments do point to a trade-off in
relation to issues of sovereignty. The CBD respondent said that through MEAs, States
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cede some amount of sovereign authority and the MP respondent talked about reaching
consensus on decisions. Both of these statements imply that some sort of trade-off occurs
when states cede “some” amount of sovereign authority or try to reach a “consensus.”
The MEAs in this study seem to have overcome any obstacles that sovereignty
may have placed in their way. It may be as Conca and Debalko say that the agreements
have actually strengthened state sovereignty. Institutions become a central focus here.
The strength of the institutions created at the state level allows the parties to handle
implementation, monitoring, and compliance. If the parties handle this process well, they
may actually help to preserve their sovereignty because the MEA does not have to step in
and tell them how to do it.
In the case of MEAs, states must be flexible on sovereignty issues because as
stated previously, “environmental processes do not respect state boundaries” (Conca and
Debalko 86). Liftin viewed sovereignty as a “historical institution whose norms and
practices have changed significantly over time” (Liftin 195). Her view is echoed by that
of Jonsson and Tallberg who say that “sovereignty is often conceived of as an attribute of
states; we speak of ‘sovereign states.’ Another understanding of sovereignty, with
resonance in contemporary IR scholarship, is in terms of an institution that defines and
empowers the state” (Jonssen and Tallberg). Both of these views fit in well with the
historical institutionalist framework of this study. Sovereignty is another institution in the
MEA process and should be examined as such. As an institution, it helps to shape the
behavior of the parties involved. In the case of the four MEAs in this research, that seems
to be in a positive way. As an institution, sovereignty may serve a different function in
different states but that does not mean it must hinder the implementation of the MEA.
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The concept of absolute sovereignty seems to have gone by the wayside as MEAs
have become more prevalent. Liftin’s notion that today “the general principle of good
neighborliness stands at the heart of contemporary conceptions of sovereignty and
environmental protection” (Liftin 278) seems to be the rule rather than the exception in
the case of these four MEAs.
Although Principle 21 and Principle 2 give states the right to pursue their own
environmental policies, they do expect that states will act responsibly as far as their
actions affect those around them. This is what MEAs do. They give states guidelines for
implementation, monitoring, and compliance but they also give them some flexibility in
deciding how this will be done. UNCCD parties must develop a National Action Plan
(NAP) to outline implementation, monitoring, and compliance but the plans are
individualized by each contracting party. If states do not feel as though they are being
“forced” to do things, compliance with these agreements may come more easily.
Collective Good
One question on the paper interview dealt with collective good. The question
asked, “in the case of MEAs, do you feel that the collective good they may produce
outweighs the parties’ self-interest?” The respondents were split on this question. The
Ramsar and MP respondents answered yes and the CBD and UNCCD respondents
answered no. The Ramsar respondent also added the comment that self-interest should
normally coincide with collective good. This may be the prevalent view in MEAs. The
self-interest of the party and what is best for the collective good should be one in the
same.
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Resources
Each respondent was asked if the MEA included separate allocations for
implementation, monitoring, and compliance; all four respondents said, “yes.” When
asked if they felt they had adequate resources available for implementation, monitoring,
and compliance the respondents from the CBD and the MP answered, “yes.” The
respondents from the UNCCD and Ramsar said, “no.” A follow up question asked if
increased funding would improve implementation, monitoring, and compliance rates. The
UNCCD and Ramsar respondents answered, “yes.” The CBD respondent answered, “no.”
The MP respondent said, “perhaps.” The Ramsar respondent also clarified his response
by saying that increased funding would improve implementation but not compliance.
The fourth question in the resources section of the paper interview asked if there
was a particular area where additional resources could make a noticeable improvement.
The CBD respondent said capacity building in developing countries. The UNCCD
respondent said implementation. The Ramsar respondent said increased funding for small
grant programmes would help.
Finally, the question was asked, “where applicable, are countries that are
financially compensated for compliance more compliant than those that are not?” The
only respondent to answer yes was the MP’s. The CBD, UNCCD, and Ramsar
respondents all chose “N/A.” Again, the MLF provides a financial outlet for the MP. The
MLF is able to fund programs to increase implementation, monitoring, and compliance.
The other three agreements simply do not have this kind of fund at their disposal.
Effectiveness
Probably the most important question on the paper interview is the one on
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effectiveness. The Guidelines on Compliance do not define effectiveness but they do say
that, “the conference of the parties of a multilateral environmental agreement could
regularly review the overall effectiveness of the agreement in meeting its objectives, and
consider how the effectiveness of a multilateral environmental agreement might be
improved” (Guidelines on Compliance, 4). It is important to note the use of the word
“could” in this statement rather than “would” or “should.” At the beginning of this
document the authors state that:
“the guidelines are advisory. They provide approaches for enhancing compliance
with multilateral environmental agreements and strengthening the enforcement of
laws implementing those agreements. It is recognized that parties to the
agreements are best situated to choose and determine useful approaches in the
context of specific obligations contained in the agreements. Although the
guidelines may inform and affect how parties implement their obligations under
the agreements, they are non-binding and do not in any manner alter these
obligations” (Guidelines on Compliance, 1).
It would seem that the use of the word “could” is intentional so as not to sound
confrontational. This may go back to the issue of respecting a party’s sovereignty.
Presented in this manner, parties are more likely to accept these guidelines than if it were
presented in a more forceful manner. Acceptance of these guidelines is important since
effectiveness of the MEA is the ultimate goal.
In regards to effectiveness, the question on the paper interview asked, “currently,
do you consider your MEA to be (1) very effective, (2) effective, (3) somewhat effective,
or (4) ineffective. Three of the respondents answered, “very effective” and one
respondent answered, “somewhat effective.” The Ramsar respondent actually chose both
“very effective” and “effective.” The “effective” response was in regards to compliance
whereas the “very effective” response was in regards to cooperation, awareness, and
capacity building.
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Of all the respondents, the one for the CBD seems to have the least amount of
confidence in the MEA. This would explain the “somewhat effective” response on this
last question. The CBD is one of the more recent MEAs and it may be that it is taking a
while for its institutional structure to function as it should. A lack of resources and the
need for capacity building may be having an impact on effectiveness as well.
How effective an MEA is depends upon several things that occur in a sort of
chain reaction. The first requirement is effective implementation. The second is to have a
system in place for monitoring. The third is to gain compliance from the parties. A lapse
at any stage of the process diminishes the overall effectiveness of the MEA.
Implementation did not appear to be a problem for any of the MEAs in this study.
Although they may be in various stages of the process, implementation is occurring. The
problems for these MEAs seem to be coming in the areas of monitoring and compliance.
According to the Global Environment Outlook 2000:
“policy assessment is made particularly difficult because of uneven monitoring, poor and
missing data, and a lack of indicators. Continuous reporting and data on the
environmental situation before and after implementation of policies are virtually non-
existent” (GEO-2000, 198). Without a formal monitoring system in place there is really
no way to enforce compliance. For this reason, monitoring may be the most important
step in the process. Through reporting:
“implementation of MEAs generally improves effectiveness by making parties
more accountable, diffusing information on successful strategies and methods,
helping to direct assistance if needed, and providing information and assessments
to guide any future development of the MEAs” (GEO-2000, 204).
Without monitoring, evaluating the effectiveness of the MEA becomes very difficult.
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Summary of Data from National Reports and Paper Survey
The data for this section comes from both the paper interview and the National
Reports. The data is compared and contrasted to draw general conclusions about the four
MEAs in this study in regards to implementation, monitoring, and compliance.
Implementation
The implementation questions on the paper interview dealt with who in the
organization is responsible for implementation and the rate of success of implementation.
Responses were received from the Montreal Protocol (MP), The Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), The Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar), and the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). All four respondents said that
their organizations held regular meetings to discuss implementation, monitoring and
compliance. In providing a more in-depth response, the CBD respondent said that COP
meetings provide guidance to Parties on implementation. The UNCCD respondent said
that they assess progress made in the implementation of the convention every year
through meetings of the COP and Subsidiary bodies. The Ramsar COP meets every three
years. The Secretariat reports problem issues to the COP, which may or may not choose
to discuss them and may agree on a recommendation. Finally, the MP secretariat arranges
and services two meetings annually of the IMPCOM (Implementation Committee) that
deals with compliance issues. None of the respondents suggested that the Secretariat was
“in charge” of implementation, monitoring, and/or compliance.
When asked who in the organization is primarily responsible for implementation,
the responses varied. The CBD respondent said that both groups at the top and local
groups were responsible for implementation. Based on the agreement, implementation is
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primarily the responsibility of the COPs. Each party is responsible for submitting reports
on measures that it has taken for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention
and their effectiveness in meeting the objectives of the Convention. On the CBD National
Reports, respondents were asked to rate the level of challenges they faced when
addressing implementation issues. The majority of the responses come in the categories
of High Challenge (3) and Medium Challenge (2) while some of the lowest responses
come in the Challenge has been Successfully Overcome (0) section. Although the CBD
respondent says that its rate of success of implementation is “successful,” based on the
National Reports, it faces challenges to implementation by the parties and these
challenges are great and not easily overcome. These challenges can create problems for
monitoring and compliance. Successful implementation does not necessarily equate to
successful monitoring and compliance. This in turn, has an effect on the overall
effectiveness of the MEA.
When asked more generally, “currently, do you consider your MEA to be: very
effective, effective, somewhat effective, or ineffective?” The CBD respondent selected
“somewhat effective.” CBD considers implementation a success but considers the overall
effectiveness of the MEA to only be “somewhat successful.” This would seem to
indicate a problem with compliance. The MEA is being implemented successfully but are
parties complying with it? This issue will be addressed later under the Monitoring and
Compliance section.
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Article 26 of the UNCCD, Communication of Information, spells out the
requirements for reporting on implementation of the UNCCD. Affected country parties
must, “communicate to the Conference of the Parties for consideration at its ordinary
sessions, through the Permanent Secretariat, reports on the measures which it has taken
for the implementation of the Convention” (UNCCD Text). This includes a description of
strategies and detailed descriptions of programmes relevant to implementation (UNCCD).
According to the Convention, “developed country parties shall report on measures taken
to assist in the preparation and implementation of action programmes, including
information on the financial resources they have provided, or are providing, under the
Convention” (UNCCD).
The UNCCD respondent chose “successful” to describe its implementation. This
is probably due in large part to the fact that implementation has been successful at the
party level. Looking at the National Reports it is apparent that implementation at the
MEA level has not been as successful. This is most likely due to the fact that the UNCCD
is a facilitating agency and the governments themselves implement the Convention.
Unlike the other three agreements, the UNCCD serves as a guideline more than anything
else and each party develops its own implementation plan. Each party creates a National
Action Plan (NAP) and programs set up under the NAP must be implemented within the
NAP and also within the framework of the UNCCD. This two step process takes time and
resources to develop.
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It is significant to note that although 73% of UNCCD projects have been
implemented within the framework of the NAP, only 37% of the projects have been
implemented within the framework of the UNCCD. All but two of the affected parties
evaluated, Mauritius and Seychelles, have established a NAP. This local level response
most likely accounts for the success rate of implementation at the party level. As one
party says, “as the primary tool for planning the application of the UNCCD at the
national level, the NAPs represent the first stage in establishing effective programs to
address land degradation and desertification. The low percentage of implementation
within the framework of the UNCCD, however, demonstrates that this local success has
not translated yet to the MEA level. Because the UNCCD is a facilitating agency perhaps
too much responsibility is left to the parties for implementation. In essence, the Parties
must comply with the guidelines for developing their NAPs before being able to measure
actual compliance with the goals of the Convention.
Implementation activities of the developed parties of the UNCCD come through
financial and technical resources and assistance in implementing the NAPs. They give
support to NGOs, IGOs, and civil organizations. This type of participation, “enhances the
capacity of local populations directly affected by desertification and drought to share
their concerns, and propose locally adapted solutions based on concrete experience and
know-how” (UNCCD National Reports - Canada).
Under Ramsar, the Secretariat encourages implementation at the National and
local levels but has no direct responsibility. When asked to rate the level of success of
implementation, the Ramsar respondent said, “somewhat successful.” To evaluate
implementation, a review of the COP8 National Reports Global Statistics was
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undertaken. An explanation of how the data was analyzed is given in Appendix 5. There
were 116 parties whose national reports were included in the analysis. Twenty-two of
these were from developed countries and 94 were from developing countries.
There were several questions in the analysis that directly asked about
implementation or included some aspect of implementation in them. There were two
responses used in the analysis: “PCTYES, percent of contracting parties answering YES,
and PCTPRG, percent of contracting parties answering YES or PARTLY or IN
PROGRESS. That is, some progress in relation to the relevant indicator has been made”
(Ramsar).
The majority of respondents when asked about implementation specifically,
responded PCTPRG. This means that the majority of the contracting parties are only
making “some” progress in relation to implementation. This may be where the
“somewhat successful” response comes from. Only 31.1% of contracting parties
answered PCTYES to these two statements regarding implementation.
Despite choosing “somewhat successful” to describe implementation, the Ramsar
respondent chose “very effective” to describe the overall status of the MEA. Again,
simply because implementation has some level of success does not mean that it will be
effective. This gap between implementation and effective implementation is bridged by
how successful the MEA is at gaining compliance. If those Parties that are having success
with implementation are also having success with compliance, then the Ramsar
respondent may view the MEA as very effective.
Finally, implementation of the MP is the responsibility of each national
government, assisted by the implementing agencies. The MP has an Implementation
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Committee which is assisted by the Secretariat. The ImpCom provides recommendations
to the MOPs. The primary task of the Implementation Committee is to consider the issue
of non-compliance which includes both cases of non-reporting and non-compliance with
control measures. The MP also has a financial mechanism for the implementation of the
Montreal Protocol called the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol (MLF). This
fund “finances incremental costs incurred by developing countries in phasing out their
consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances” (Ozone.unep.org). The MP
respondent rated the implementation as successful and it is considered to be one of the
most universally adhered to international environmental agreements.
Each respondent was also asked if their organizations hold regular meetings to
discuss implementation, monitoring, and compliance. All respondents answered yes. The
UNCCD assesses progress made in the implementation of the Convention every year
through meetings of the COP and subsidiary bodies. CBD COP meetings provide
guidance to parties on implementation. The Ramsar COP meets every three years. The
Secretariat reports problems to the COP, which may or may not choose to address them.
The MP Secretariat arranges and services two meetings annually of the IMPCOM that
deals with compliance issues.
Monitoring and Compliance
The second section of the paper interview dealt with monitoring and
compliance issues. The first question asked if the respondents had a system in place for
monitoring and compliance. All four answered yes. Each was then asked to explain what
kind of system was in place. The CBD has established the National Reporting System
under Article 26 of their convention. They have not, however, established a compliance
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regime. The UNCCD has a committee for the review of implementation of the
Convention and meets every two years. Ramsar parties are required under Article 3.2 to
report problems. The Secretariat interprets this to mean they can make inquiries of the
Parties based on citizen and NGO problems as well. The Parties’ replies can be reported
to the COP under Article 8.2. The MP provides provisions within the Protocol for a
system to monitor compliance. All four MEAs use National Reporting to monitor
compliance.
Although all respondents have a system in place for monitoring, the frequency of
monitoring varies. The respondents were asked to choose very frequently (more than
once a year), frequently (at least once a year), infrequently (less than once a year), or not
at all. The MP respondent chose very frequently, the UNCCD respondent chose
frequently, and the Ramsar respondent chose infrequently. The CBD respondent did not
make a specific choice but did comment that National Reports are submitted by Parties
according to the format and intervals established by the COP. In terms of what institution
or institutions are responsible for compliance, the CBD and UNCCD respondents chose
COPs, The Ramsar respondent chose Secretariat and COPs, and the MP respondent chose
Secretariat and Implementation Committee.
When asked about the level of priority given to identification and monitoring,
100% of developed nations give it high or medium priority compared to 82% of
developing countries. Overall, almost 60% of both developed and developing countries
give a high level of priority to monitoring.
When asked about the percentage of countries that have a mechanism to maintain
and organize data derived from inventories and monitoring programmes and coordinate
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information collection and management at the national level, the majority of parties here
answered some degree of “yes.” There is again a discrepancy between developed and
developing parties. While 53% of developed parties answered, “yes, some mechanisms or
systems in place,” only 31% of developing parties answered the question the same.
Conversely, for the response, “yes, a relatively complete system is in place,” 13% of
developing countries chose this answer as opposed to 7% of developed countries.
The CBD respondent rated the success of monitoring as “not very successful.” It
could be that he considers anything less than 100% of systems or mechanisms in place a
failure. When the majority of both developed and developing countries give a high
priority to monitoring and a majority of both have some systematic monitoring
programme in place, then there is at least some base level of success with monitoring.
However, the CBD respondent states that it has no compliance regime so perhaps without
any formal way to measure compliance, they also have no way to really measure the
success of the monitoring programmes in place.
Ramsar seems to have a system in place for monitoring compliance but since the
Ramsar respondent’s answer to the frequency of monitoring question was “infrequently,”
it would seem that this system is not adhered to on a regular basis.
The responses indicate that for the most part monitoring systems are in place or
some progress is being made towards establishing a system for monitoring. Ramsar’s
response that compliance is monitored infrequently, though, would seem to indicate that
although a system is in place, it is not used that often and/ or not that efficiently. This
could be why Ramsar rated the success of monitoring only “somewhat successful.” These
two “somewhat successful” responses in relation to implementation and monitoring could
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indicate that there will also be problems with compliance. This issue will be looked at
later in the chapter.
Monitoring of the UNCCD is inconsistent at best. As part of the NAP, each
country is required to list mechanisms for monitoring implementation. Of the 23 reports
analyzed, only 9 have any sort of active monitoring program. These include collecting
data and maintaining databases, tracking the rate of reduction of certain benchmarks, and
creating institutions to monitor progress. Uganda has the Poverty Eradication Action Plan
(PEAP) which is “reviewed every three years to assess performance, achievements, and
failures” and is considered “a monitoring mechanism for all sectors” (UNCCD National
Reports - Uganda). Zimbabwe has a “Department of Monitoring” which is located in the
Office of the President and Cabinet. The Department of Monitoring is:
“responsible for overall Government Policy implementation. In the environment
sector the national environmental monitoring and observation capacity has been
improved by the formulation of the National Environmental Policy and the
Environmental Management Act. These policy and legal instruments clearly
indicate the areas to be monitored, the responsibilities for monitoring and
production of state of the environment reports, etc. In addition they stipulate the
formulation of environmental management plans that will provide ongoing
baseline information for monitoring. It is however not clear how effective the
monitoring mechanism at sub-national level will be given the limited staff
capacity in existing institutions. There is also a capacity gap between the national
institutions and district, ward and village level institutions in terms of their
capacity to develop indicators and apply these to monitor environmental changes”
(UNCCD National Reports- Uganda).
Nigeria has actually launched a satellite into space to help with monitoring.
NIGERIASAT 1 was launched on September 27, 2003. It monitors and provides “real
time information on the distribution of environmental resources and incidence of land
degradation. A Ground Station has been established in Abuja to receive and collate data
from the satellite. In addition a Remote Sensing Center (Centre for Remote Sensing) has
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been established in Jos, in Plateau state to analyze and interpret satellite imageries”
(UNCCD National Reports - Nigeria). This is one of the more high-tech approaches to
monitoring seen from a UNCCD party. In addition to the use of technology for
monitoring, Nigeria also has an annual state of the environment report which facilitates
monitoring and evaluation of projects (UNCCD National Reports - Nigeria).
In contrast to these countries which seem to at least have baseline programs in
place for monitoring implementation, there are a handful struggling with getting
monitoring programs up and running. Ghana is one country that “lacks any systematic
benchmarks or indicators for assessing implementation of the convention or the extent of
desertification …since change is in relation to some previously existing state the first task
for national resource and other environmental monitoring is to ascertain some baseline
conditions for monitoring” (UNCCD National Reports - Ghana). Mauritius has set
evaluation parameters for monitoring but none have become operational yet.
Mozambique has “no single harmonized mechanism to monitor the implementation of the
NAP and drought related activities in the country. However, individual sectors have their
own system to monitor different areas” (UNCCD National Reports - Mozambique).
Swaziland and Zambia both say a lack of financial resources, trained personnel, and
equipment has constrained their abilities to monitor implementation.
A review of the National Reports of the UNCCD showed that few countries have
a system in place for monitoring. Those that do not are currently working towards
establishing some kind of monitoring system. When asked to rate the success of
monitoring the UNCCD respondent’s answer was “very successful” but this would seem
to be at odds with what the National Reports actually say. As previously stated, only nine
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out of 23 countries have an established system for monitoring. These numbers would not
seem to warrant a response of “very successful.” Analysis of the National Reports,
however, do indicate that countries have made this a priority. Most of the countries that
do not have a structured monitoring system already in place have either a plan developed
or some components already set up.
The MLF of the MP is a fund that “provides funds to help developing countries
(also known as Article 5 countries) to comply with their obligations under the Protocol to
phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) at an agreed schedule”
(Multilateral Fund).The MP was the first international treaty to contain a financial
mechanism like the MLF and it “embodies the principle that countries have a common
but differentiated responsibility to protect and manage the global commons” (Multilateral
Fund). Contributions to the MLF come from industrialized nations and there are four
implementing agencies responsible for distributing the funds: United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the World Bank.
The fund is replenished every three years and from 1991 - 2005 funds amounted to US$
2.1 billion (Multilateral Fund).
Under guidelines established by the MLF, monitoring of the MP is done by
recording reductions in production and consumption of the controlled substances
identified in the Annexes of the Protocol itself. Ground based measurements and satellite
based measurements are used to take readings. With this approach, the MP has one of the
more accurate and complete systems for monitoring compliance which leaves little room
for error providing the equipment used is reliable. The parties are required to submit this
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data based on the schedule laid out in the agreement. The agreement also requires the
parties to “establish an Executive Committee to develop and monitor the implementation
of the specific operational policies, guidelines and administrative arrangements, including
disbursement of resources, for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Multilateral
Fund” (Montreal Protocol Text). Projects that experience delays or those that carry
financial balances “are monitored more closely and are reported to each Executive
Committee meeting” (Multilateral Fund). Of the four MEAs in this study, the MP has one
of the more formalized monitoring systems in place. It is also the only one in the study to
mention any sort of follow-up to non-compliance outside of waiting for the next National
Reports to be submitted.
When asked to rate the success of monitoring, the MP respondent chose “very
successful.” Evidence in the summaries of the National Reports would seem to back up
this assertion. The MLF not only aids in implementation of the MP but also in monitoring
and evaluation of the programs being financed. In this way, “the process of monitoring
and evaluation not only ensures that the funds disbursed are actually being used to meet
the project objectives but it is also a tool to assess the overall effectiveness of the Fund in
phasing out ozone depleting substances” (Multilateral Fund).
Each respondent was also asked to identify the tools used to measure compliance.
The CBD and the UNCCD respondents said they use National Reports. The Ramsar
respondent said it also uses National Reports and a Sites Database (the Montreux Record)
that includes data on reported threats but it is not systematic. The “Montreux Record” is a
list of Ramsar sites requiring special attention but including a site on the record is
voluntary. However, including a site on the Record makes it eligible for international
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assistance and a Ramsar Advisory Mission. The MP has annual reports (National
Reports) of the Parties per Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol and the Ozone Secretariat at
ODS Database. Although the CBD uses the National Reports to measure compliance they
also noted that they had no formal compliance regime in place. According to the CBD:
“the CBD does not have any procedures and mechanisms for addressing cases of
non-compliance. However, Article 26 requires parties to submit national reports
regarding measures taken to implement the Convention. This provides and avenue
for assessing Parties’ compliance with the provisions of the Convention. The
Convention, however, does not specify what is to happen where cases of non-
compliance are detected through the national reporting system. The COP
regularly reviews the national reports provided by the Parties. On the basis of this
review, the COP develops additional guidance to Parties on the implementation of
their obligations under the Convention. The responses provided in the document
do not relate to compliance but rather to implementation”
When asked the follow-up question, “if you have limited or no success with compliance,
to what do you attribute this?” the Ramsar respondent selected problems with
implementation (the Ramsar respondent added the note, “resources usually”) and the
CBD respondent selected problems with monitoring and problems with implementation.
The UNCCD and MP respondents did not answer this question.
In the case of the MP, the overall tone of the respondent to the paper interview is
that he considers all aspects of the MEA to be successful at some level, including
compliance. The National Reports of the MP give the most specific details in regards to
compliance. Of the four MEAs in this study, the MP is the only one to use statistical data
to assess compliance. Compliance data was taken from the United Nations Environment
Programme Sixteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer (22-26 November 2004): Report of the Secretariat on data and
consideration of compliance issues (UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/4 and 16/4/Add.1). The
information used in the report was received between 18 October 2004 and 11 November
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2004.
The Implementation Committee considers all issues of non-reporting of base year
data. All parties are required to report data each year to the Secretariat (under the MP,
Article 5 parties are developing countries). In regards to compliance, “the Secretariat has
checked the status of data reporting for the years 1986 -2003 which is the period for
which parties are required to have reported data, and a total of 156 Parties, 38 non-Article
5 Parties and 118 Article 5 Parties have complied fully with the ozone-depleting
substance reporting requirements under Article 7, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Protocol”
(UNEP). In an effort to obtain outstanding data, the Secretariat sends out reminders
regarding missing data to the Parties concerned (UNEP). There are four Parties listed in
the report that have never reported any data: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cook Islands, and
Niue.
The UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/4 report indicates how well parties to the MP are
complying with required reporting deadlines and how well they are maintaining
production and consumption levels of ODS. Of note in Table 5.12 is the number of
parties that have complied with the reporting requirement. With the exception of 2003,
the compliance rate for reporting is approximately 97%. Even for 2003 the rate is still
almost 84%. Those are astonishing numbers. The combination of successful
implementation and successful monitoring leads to high rates of compliance.
Complying with reporting though, does not necessarily mean Parties are doing what they
are supposed to be doing but evidence shows that Parties to the MP are complying with
the guidelines set out in the Protocol. When you look at production levels versus
consumption levels (or zero consumption) Parties are not only complying with reporting
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requirements but also with production and (zero) consumption requirements. According
to the report, fewer numbers of Parties are producing or exporting ODSs while greater
numbers are reporting zero consumption. It is interesting to note that the MP respondent
answered “partially” when asked about countries complying with the MP. It may be that
there should have been another choice to that question; almost completely because that is
a more accurate description of compliance with the MP. Between 1986 and 2003, 155
Parties (both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 Parties) have fully complied with the reporting
requirements of the MP. Only 4 Parties out of 189 have never reported any data. The MP
is a highly effective MEA.
Ramsar uses the National Reports and on-site monitoring to assess compliance.
Article 3.2 of the Convention says that, “each contracting party shall arrange to be
informed at the earliest possible time if the ecological character of any wetland in its
territory and included in the List has changed, is changing, or is likely to change as a
result of technological developments, pollution or other human interference. Information
on such changes shall be passed without delay to the organization or government
responsible for the continuing bureau duties specified in Article 8” (Ramsar). This does
not make as strong a statement as the compliance requirements of the MP but this does
not mean it is any less effective. The Monitoring Procedure was adopted in 1990 and “is
presented as a scientific, technical, and management assistance process rather than as a
noncompliance procedure. Its purpose is not to ‘detect noncompliance’ but to ‘assist
implementation’” (Victor, et al 68). Presenting it in this manner takes away the negativity
of the concept of noncompliance and may actually encourage compliance. If Parties are
not afraid of repercussions for noncompliance, they are more likely to report problems
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and receive the assistance they need to fix them.
Ramsar also uses the Montreux Record to document sites requiring special
attention. The Ramsar respondent noted in his paper interview response that including a
site on the Record is voluntary but if a site is reported and included on the list, it becomes
eligible for international assistance. This would seem to encourage compliance as well
since, in essence, Parties are going to be “rewarded” for reporting problems. The
combination of the on-site monitoring and the Montreux Record make for a very
effective system for monitoring compliance.
The UNCCD also uses National Reports to assess compliance. It also has a
committee for the review of the implementation of the Convention which meets every
two years. The UNCCD only entered into force in 1996 and it has already been shown
that its record on implementation is not that good. It may be too early to assess the
compliance record of the UNCCD. The UNCCD has a two stage implementation process
which begins with the development of the NAP. The second stage deals with
implementing the UNCCD through the NAP. Many of the affected parties have yet to
develop or institute an NAP without which implementation cannot really take place.
Some may have systems in place for monitoring, but again, without implementation
occurring, there is little to monitor. And yet, when asked the overall status of its MEA,
the UNCCD respondent said “very effective.” It is difficult to accept this statement as
true when so much work still needs to be done on implementation, monitoring, and
compliance.
Like the previous three MEAs, the CBD uses National Reports to assess
compliance but the comment was made on the paper interview that the CBD has not
95
established a compliance regime. The Convention does not specify what happens in the
case of non-compliance. Much like the UNCCD, the CBD has not been in force as long
as the MP and Ramsar. It entered into force in 1993. In its National Reporting guidelines,
the CBD says that, “the objective of National Reporting, as specified in Article 26 of the
Convention, is to provide information on measures taken for the implementation of the
Convention and the effectiveness of these measures. The reporting process is therefore
not intended to elicit information on the status and trends of biological diversity as such
in the country concerned, except in so far as such information is relevant to the account
of the implementation measures” (National Report Analysis). In other words, the CBD is
not interested in the small details. It wants to see the overall picture as it relates to
implementation and ultimately, compliance.
The National Reports for the CBD are extremely lengthy and very detailed so
although it has no formal compliance regime the Reports offer a great deal of information
in regards to implementation, monitoring, and compliance. All the CBD is saying is that
it has no system for dealing with noncompliance. The National Reports are still a good
indicator for those Parties that are complying. Based on the information in the National
Reports, programs have been implemented by both developed and developing countries
and monitoring systems are in place to evaluate implementation. The level of
noncompliance should be fairly low. Even so, the CBD respondent chose “somewhat
effective” when asked about the overall effectiveness of the MEA. Perhaps the
respondent feels that the CBD would need some sort of compliance regime in place
before it could be considered more effective.
The paper interview also asked more specific questions in regards to compliance
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and individual countries. The question asked was, “Do you find that for the most part,
countries comply: completely, partially, or not at all?” The Ramsar, CBD, and MP
respondents chose partially. Only the UNCCD respondent selected completely. This
seems like an odd choice considering the gaps in implementation, monitoring, and
compliance evident in the National Reports but it may be basing its response on the
number of countries that have submitted National Reports rather than what is actually in
the reports. Of importance to note is that no respondent chose “not at all.” In these four
cases, countries are at least making an effort to comply, either by submitting reports or
actually following the guidelines laid out in their respective MEAs.
Still another question asked, “if you find your compliance rate to be mostly
complete or partially complete, to what do you attribute your success? The choices here
were implementation, successful monitoring, or successful cooperation of Parties
involved. The Ramsar and UNCCD respondents chose successful cooperation of Parties
involved. The MP respondent chose successful implementation and attributed compliance
to successful implementing of programs of institutional strengthening by UNEP/ DTIE
and other implementing agencies. The existence of the MLF and the Implementation
Committee in the MP goes a long way in assisting in implementation, monitoring, and
compliance of the MP. The CBD respondent did not answer this question.
The question was also asked, “for your specific MEA, do you find that most
parties: have the capacity and intent to comply, have the intent to comply but lack the
capacity to do so, or have the capacity to comply but no intent to do so.” All four
respondents chose countries have the intent to comply but lack the capacity to do so.
According to Agenda 21, Section 37.1, National Mechanisms and International
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Cooperation for Capacity-building:
“the ability of a country to follow sustainable development paths is determined to
a large extent by the capacity of its people and its institutions as well as by its
ecological and geographical conditions. Specifically, capacity-building
encompasses the country's human, scientific, technological, organizational,
institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of capacity-building is
to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to
policy choices and modes of implementation among development options, based
on an understanding of environmental potentials and limits and of needs as
perceived by the people of the country concerned. As a result, the need to
strengthen national capacities is shared by all countries” ( UNEP.org).
The National Reports of the CBD ask specific questions regarding capacity
building. The responses to these questions appear to be mixed. Measures have been taken
to strengthen the capacity of indigenous and local communities and mechanisms have
been put in place for this purpose. But when asked, “has your country assisted indigenous
and local community organizations to hold regional meetings to discuss the outcomes of
the Conference of the Parties and to prepare for meetings under the Convention?”, the
responses show that there remains a disconnect between the local communities and the
Conference of the Parties. An overwhelming 78% of both developed and developing
countries responded “No” to this question. If these regional meetings are not being held,
how are the Parties supposed to know what is going on? If they are not aware of the
outcomes of the COPs, it would be difficult for them to know what is expected of them.
And if they do not know what is expected of them, how can they possibly prepare for
meetings under the Convention?
Ramsar also addresses the issue of capacity building in its National Reports. The
responses here indicate that the majority of the Parties are working towards improving
capacity building. High percentages of both “yes” responses and those making progress
given in response to “promotion of local stakeholder management of wetlands” and “govt
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support to site managers (and local communities) in monitoring ecological character of
Ramsar sites” are particularly important because they show that local communities are
taking responsibility for implementation and monitoring at the local level and are getting
the support that they need to do so.
The UNCCD is the only MEA whose Convention text specifically mentions
capacity building. Under Article 19, “the Parties recognize the significance of capacity
building - that is to say, institution building, training and development of relevant local
and national capacities - in efforts to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of
drought“ (UNCCD). Article 19 then lists several ways to promote capacity building
including full participation at all levels of local people with the cooperation of NGOs and
local organizations and “more effective operation of existing national institutions and
legal frameworks and, where necessary, creation of new ones, along with strengthening
of strategic planning and management” (UNCCD). Evidence that capacity building is
occurring can be seen in the National Reports. Several parties mention the creation of
specific offices or institutions to handle implementation and monitoring at all levels. For
example, Tanzania has an Environmental Working Group (EWG) with members from the
private sector, NGOs, development partners, and the private sector (UNCCD National
Reports - Tanzania). In Kenya, “the various relevant actors involved in funding and
management activities to combat desertification include the government, private sector,
civil society, international partners and the community. The government provides funds,
technical support and the enabling environment; the private sector, civil society, and
international partners provide funds and technical support; while the community provide
funds, indigenous knowledge and management skills” (UNCCD National Reports -
99
Kenya). Most of the other reports mention capacity building in some way. This is
particularly important for the UNCCD because it takes a bottom-up approach with
implementation, monitoring, and compliance. The responsibility for laying the
groundwork for implementation falls to the local communities first.
Capacity building under the MP comes through the United Nations Development
Programme’s (UNDP) Montreal Protocol Unit (MPU) which “works closely with
relevant stakeholders at the national level to ensure sustainability of programming and
contribute to capacity development and works with public and private partners in
developing countries to assist them in meeting the targets of the MP” (UNDP.org).
MPU/UNDP is one of the implementing agencies for the MLF and is working in 91
countries to help them phase out the use of ODS. They do this by providing assistance to
governments “in developing more effective national policies and programmes to meet
compliance targets for eliminating ODS including, development of country programmes,
refrigerant management plans, national and sector phase-out strategies and, institutional
strengthening” (UNDP.org).
Respondents were also asked if certain parties were particularly problematic and
to identify them. The Ramsar, CBD, and MP respondents all said that there were
problematic parties. The UNCCD respondent said no which would make sense if they
truly do get countries to comply completely. When asked for specific examples, the CBD
respondent said that developing countries and transitional economies have problems with
implementation due to lack of capacities. The MP respondent said that out of the 184
parties only 175-176 report data but that still means that approximately 95% of parties are
reporting data. A few of the problem countries named by the MP respondent were Central
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African Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Turkmenistan, and
Liechtenstein. All but one of these is a developing country. The UNCCD respondent
answered no to this question and added that these are issues under negotiation and not for
the Secretariat to prejudge.
Finally, in regards to compliance, respondents were asked what methods were
used to gain compliance: financial incentives, formal regulations, formal punishments, or
reporting. All respondents chose reporting.
The influence of outside institutions on implementation, monitoring, and
compliance was also addressed in the paper interview. The term “outside” was used
because these institutions are not normally part of the institutional framework of the
MEA itself. In the course of this research, however, it was discovered that three out of the
four agreements do have a scientific and/or technical body as part of their institutional
framework. The CBD has a Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological
Advice (SBSTTA). Ramsar has the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP).
Finally, the UNCCD has the Committee on Science and Technology.
The institutions specified on the paper interview were non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), scientific and/or
technical bodies, and private sector organizations. NGOs and IGOs are the two main
types of international organizations. Non-governmental organizations are private
organizations that do not have the legal status as a government. They are considered
independent of governments but many NGOs are recognized as important political
institutions. Greenpeace, the International Red Cross, and the International Olympic
Committee are all examples of important NGOs. Inter-governmental organizations, in
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contrast to non-governmental, have national governments as members. The European
Union (EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN) are all
examples of inter-governmental organizations.
Two questions were asked. First, do any of these outside institutions play a role in
implementation, monitoring, and/ or compliance? The UNCCD respondent said all four
play a role in implementation and scientific and/or technical bodies play a role in
monitoring. The UNCCD respondent’s answer is not surprising for two reasons. First, the
text of the Convention is very specific about cooperation among institutions and
organizations at all levels. Article 3, Section c states, “the Parties should develop, in a
spirit of partnership, cooperation among all levels of government, communities, non-
governmental organizations and landholders to establish a better understanding of the
nature and value of land and scarce water resources in affected areas and to work towards
their sustainable use” (UNCCD). This is a key principle of the UNCCD agreement.
Participation of government, communities, non-governmental organizations and
landholders is not only encouraged but expected.
The second reason is that the UNCCD uses a bottom-up approach when it comes
to implementing the NAP, and, ultimately, the UNCCD. Using a bottom-up approach
would require that implementation start at the local level and work its way up. This
would involve local governments and private organizations first. The National Reports
for the UNCCD ask parties to give information regarding implementation of the National
Action Plan (NAP). The report submitted by Ethiopia said that, “significant strides have
been made to implement the UNCCD. The finalization of the NAP through wider
stakeholder participation including NGOs and CBOs, government institutions, and
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concerned civil societies is one of the major achievements that paved the way for the
UNCCD/NAP implementation in Ethiopia” (UNCCD National Report - Ethiopia). Ghana
has a similar statement in their report that says, “all these structures were involved in the
elaboration of the NAP through the bottom-up approach where information was
generated from the community to district, regional and national levels for the preparation
of the NAP. The people were also actively involved in taking decisions at the local,
district, regional, and national consultive for a on the NAP” (UNCCD National Report -
Ghana). The Sudan’s report states, “a National Action Plan (NAP) to combat
desertification was completed in 1998 for 13 states classified as degraded. In the NAP
formulation process, a bottom-up approach was adopted. Workshops were organized at
state levels, followed by a series of workshops at national level. Draft proposals from
states and national workshops were synthesized to come up with a national action plan
document… the NAP also provides framework for involvement of private sector, donors
and local communities in efforts of desertification control” (UNCCD National Report -
Sudan). Benin’s report stated that, “it is worthy to underline that, some of the Non
Governmental Organisations accredited to the United Nations for the Convention’s
implementation, other NGOs, grassroots community and associations are deeply involved
in the implementation of projects and programs” (UNCCD National Report - Benin).
The UNCCD is unique on two levels. First, unlike most MEAs, participation of
developed countries is mostly through financial and technical resources. Developed
countries are not directly impacted by desertification and drought on a daily basis. For
this reason, developed countries provide the funding and technical assistance to assist the
countries most in need with implementing the UNCCD. Canada for example, “has
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provided considerable financial and technical support to partner countries to ensure the
involvement of civil society and NGO representatives. Such participation enhances the
capacity of local populations directly affected by desertification and drought to share
their concerns, and propose locally adapted solutions based on concrete experience and
know-how” (UNCCD National Reports - Canada). The contribution of developed
countries to the UNCCD will be discussed further later on.
The second unique characteristic of the UNCCD is that each country develops its
own institutional framework to implement the UNCCD. Each country must develop a
National Action Plan (NAP) within the framework of the UNCCD. This means
implementation takes place on two levels; within the framework of the NAP and within
the framework of the UNCCD. Kenya has a list of 17 institutions that are involved in
implementation starting with the national coordinating body (NEMA) which serves as the
focal point for UNCCD and other MEAs and ending with the private sector. Also
included on the list are local authorities, civil society organizations (NGOs and CBOs),
and public universities. Lesotho has also created specific institutions to deal with
implementation; “the National Environment Secretariat (NES) was established in 1994
and is responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the National
Action Programme (NAP) on the CCD. The National Desertification Steering Committee
(NDSC) oversees the elaboration and implementation of the NAP. The NDSC operates
under the auspices of the NES. Its principle objective is to serve as the main organ
through which the NES advises and guides the Government, private and public sectors on
the conservation, protection and sustainable use of the country’s natural resources”
(UNCCD National Reports - Lesotho). Lesotho also has district level desertification
104
steering committees to handle things at the district and local levels. Parties to the
UNCCD have to operate not only within the framework of the UNCCD but within the
framework of their own NAPs.
The Ramsar respondent said that NGOs play a role in implementation,
monitoring, and compliance. Scientific and/or technical bodies were involved in
implementation and monitoring and private sector organizations in implementation only.
Ramsar allows NGOs, private industry, civic groups, local communities and indigenous
groups to participate in the deliberations of the Parties (Global Development Research
Center). Two areas address this issue on the National Reports. Although the percentages
are fairly low for these responses, it does indicate that both private sector organizations
and NGOs are involved in the process.
The CBD respondent said that NGOs play a role in implementation and
monitoring. In particular, the CBD respondent specified indigenous and local community
organizations. Article 23 specifies that “any other body or agency, whether governmental
or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, which has informed the Secretariat of its wishes to be represented as
an observer at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties may be admitted unless at least
one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall
be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties” (CBD). So,
although the CBD respondent said that NGOs play a role in implementation and
monitoring, it would seem that other than those organizations specifically mentioned on
the paper interview, other institutions and organizations were never intended to play a
very active role. Also, despite having the SBSTTA, the CBD respondent indicated they
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play no role in implementation, monitoring, or compliance.
The MP respondent did not answer this question specifically but did say that, “the
Multilateral Fund established under Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol, together with the
Implementing Agencies funded by the MLF, play a crucial role in the implementation
and compliance with the provisions of the Montreal Protocol.” The MP also addresses
this issue in the text of the Convention with almost the exact same wording as in the
CBD. Article 11, section 5 specifies that, “any body or agency, whether national or
international, governmental or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the
protection of the ozone layer which has informed the Secretariat of its wishes to be
represented at a Meeting of the Parties as an observer may be admitted unless at least one
third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be
subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Parties” (MP). Here again, the wording
of this statement implies a very limited role for NGOs and IGOs. The MP respondent
makes no mention of them in any of the paper interview question responses which would
seem to indicate that they do not consider them important in implementation, monitoring,
and compliance. Unlike Ramsar and the UNCCD, it would seem that their participation
is not actively sought out by the MP or the CBD.
The second question asked if the respondents considered the role these outside
institutions play to be very influential, somewhat influential, or not very influential. In
terms of NGOs, both the UNCCD and Ramsar respondents chose very influential, the
CBD respondent chose somewhat influential, and the MP respondent chose not very
influential. For IGOs, the UNCCD respondent chose very influential, the Ramsar
respondent chose somewhat influential, and the MP respondent chose not very
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influential. The UNCCD and Ramsar respondents both said that scientific and/ or
technical bodies were somewhat influential. The MP respondent’s response was again not
very influential. With respect to private sector organizations, the UNCCD, Ramsar, and
MP respondents all chose not very influential. These responses coincide with the
information listed above.
The issue of resources was also addressed on the paper interview. The first
question asked if respondents believed they had adequate resources for implementation,
monitoring, and compliance. The MP and CBD respondents answered “yes” while the
Ramsar and UNCCD respondents answered “no.” They were next asked if their funding
included separate allocations for implementation, monitoring, and compliance. All
responded “yes” to this question. A third question asked if increased funding would
improve implementation, monitoring, and compliance. The UNCCD and Ramsar
respondents answered “yes” while the CBD respondent answered “no.” The MP
respondent simply commented, “perhaps.” The Ramsar respondent also added that
increased funding would improve implementation but not compliance.
The respondents were also asked if there were particular areas where additional
resources could make a noticeable improvement in outcomes. The UNCCD respondent
noted implementation while the CBD respondent said capacity building in developing
countries. The Ramsar respondent noted that, “we have small grants programmes to
enable conservation work on the ground by governments and NGOs in developing
countries, but they are chronically underfunded compared to the good proposals
received.”
The CBD National Reports have several questions that address the issue of
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incentive measures and resources, including the level of priority given to incentive
measures. The results here are mixed. When combined, only 28% of both developed and
developing countries gave the issue high priority. Low priority was chosen by 30% of
both developed and developing countries. Although 44% of both chose medium level of
priority that is still not a majority of the respondents. In response to the question, “has
your country established programmes to identify and adopt economically and socially
sound measures that act as incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of
components of biological diversity?” Seventy-four percent of both developed and
developing countries said that some programmes or comprehensive programmes are in
place. So, although it is given a low or medium priority, 74% say they have done it.
However, establishing the programs is not the same as implementing them.
When asked, “has your country developed training and capacity-building
programmes to implement incentive measures and promote private-sector initiatives?”
58% of both the respondents basically answered, “No.” Only 35% said that “some”
programmes were in place and only 5% said the “many” programs were in place. The
groundwork has been laid but there does not seem to be much follow though at this point.
Ramsar National Reports also address the issue of incentive measures. Section 8.1
of the National Reports Analysis addresses the issue of promoting incentive measures
that encourage the application of the wise use principle, and the removal of perverse
incentives. The percentages here are fairly low. Much like with the CBD, incentive
measures under Ramsar do not seem to be given a very high priority.
The texts of the CBD, the MP, and the UNCCD all contain specific articles to
address the issue of financial mechanisms to assist with implementation. The wording in
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all three is similar. A financial mechanism will be established to assist the developing
parties to carry out their responsibilities under the individual conventions. The three texts
are very specific that these financial mechanisms are to assist the developing parties only.
Funding for the MP comes from the MLF. The fund is replenished every 3 years
and between 1991 - 2005 contributions to the fund from 49 industrialized nations totaled
approximately US 2.1 billion. These funds are used to help Article 5 Parties which
currently account for 143 of the 189 Parties to the MP (Multilateral Fund). The MLF has
been very successful in assisting these Parties with implementation and it lists several of
its achievements on its webpage:
The achievements of the Multilateral Fund can be measured through the rate of
payment of contributions, technology transfer, ODS phase-out, and the behavioural
and institutional changes it has stimulated.
• Donor countries have held to their commitments to provide funding with more
than 90 per cent of the pledged contributions having been paid, amounting to US
$1.865 billion out of a total of US $2.1 billion between 1991 and 2005.
• By December 2004, the Fund had supported the transfer of technology and
capacity building through about 5000 projects and activities in 139 developing
countries.
• Projects approved through 2004 have already eliminated the consumption of
nearly 169,800 ODP tonnes and the production of 74,600 ODP tonnes.
• National Ozone Units have been established in 139 developing countries, raising
understanding of how to implement environmental regulations and the capacity
and confidence to do so.
• Virtually all Parties to the Protocol have been able to meet their phase-out targets,
and prospects are good that this success rate will be continued in the future.
• This, in turn, will result in a lowering of levels of ODS in the stratosphere.
• Achievements of international significance
• The Fund has played a pivotal role in demonstrating that international
environmental agreements can be highly successful.
• The idea of funding only 'incremental costs' has been very successful and could
have widespread implications for other agreements.
• The Fund is an excellent model of how to achieve successful technology transfer
which could make both economic and environmental sense.
(Source: Multilateralfund.org)
The funding to assist affected Parties of the UNCCD comes from developed
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Parties. In Article 21 of the UNCCD, the text states that:
“the Conference of the Parties shall promote the availability of financial
mechanisms and shall encourage such mechanisms to seek to maximize the
availability of funding for affected developing country Parties, particularly those
in Africa, to implement the Convention. In order to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of existing financial mechanisms, a Global Mechanism to promote
actions leading to the mobilization and channeling of substantial financial
resources, including for the transfer of technology, on a grant basis, and/ or on
concessional or other terms, to affected developing country Parties, is hereby
established. This Global Mechanism shall function under the authority and
guidance of the Conference of the Parties and be accountable to it” (UNCCD).
Without financial assistance from the developed Parties, the affected Parties would be
unable to implement, monitor, or comply with the UNCCD. Although developed Parties
offer assistance in other ways, help comes primarily through financial donations. The
information on financial resources comes from the National Reports completed by the
developed Parties.
Several million US dollars and Euros have already been given to affected Parties
under the UNCCD. But implementation of the UNCCD is a slow process and more
money is needed to help speed the process along. As the UNCCD indicated on the paper
interview, increased funding would improve implementation, monitoring and
compliance, and particularly implementation. Affected Parties to the UNCCD are still
developing their NAPs and until those are complete true implementation of the UNCCD
cannot take place. Hopefully additional funding can improve this developmental process.
The financial mechanism of the CBD is controlled by the Conference of the
Parties. In Article 21 the mechanism for the provision of financial resources is laid out.
Accordingly, “the Conference of the Parties shall determine the policy, strategy, program
priorities as well as detailed criteria and guidelines for eligibility for access to and
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utilization of the financial resources including monitoring and evaluation on a regular
basis of such utilization” (CBD). The COP is also responsible for monitoring the
effectiveness of the established financial mechanism.
There are several questions on the National Reports that relate to financial
resources. The percentages of both developed and developing countries that give both
financial resources and financial mechanisms either high or medium priority is 72% and
74% respectively. Fifty percent of both give high priority to financial mechanism. Based
on these numbers, these are important aspects of the Convention for both developing and
developed parties.
There were two very interesting questions asked on the CBD National Reports.
The first was for developed countries only. It asked, “on article 20(2), has your country
provided new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to
meet the agreed incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfill the
obligations of the Convention?” The responses are encouraging. Sixty-seven percent of
developed countries said “Yes” while only 33% said “No.” The second question, for the
developing countries only asked, “has your country received new and additional financial
resources to enable it to meet the agreed full incremental cost of implementing measures
which fulfill the obligations of the Convention?” Logically the answers here should
coincide with those of the developed countries but this is not the case. The opposite is
actually true. Fifty-one percent of developing countries said “No” while only 33% said
“Yes.” On the one hand it seems that developed countries are providing the necessary
funds but on the other, they are not reaching the intended recipients.
The issue of mechanisms for gaining financial support was also addressed in the
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National Reports. There are two things that are of importance to note. First, the majority
of respondents to both of these questions answered “No.” It could be that there is a
disconnect between the National level and the local level that is preventing resources
from being distributed more efficiently. The CBD respondent was one of two to say that
it had adequate resources available for implementation, monitoring, and compliance and
the only respondent to say that increased funding would not improve implementation,
monitoring, and compliance. Perhaps it is not the funding level that is the problem but
how it is getting distributed.
The second important aspect to note is the use of the term “perverse” incentives.
This is the second time this term has come up in the analysis of the National Reports. The
term was also used in the Ramsar National Reports. Although incentives are an important
aspect of the implementation process, using perverse incentives can do more harm than
good. The incentive must be beneficial. It if it is not, then it needs to be removed. Both
CBD and Ramsar make provisions for this removal in their National Reports.
Ramsar is the only MEA whose convention text does not contain a separate article
for a financial mechanism. Article 6, section 5 does say that “the Conference of the
Contracting Parties shall establish and keep under review the financial regulations of this
Convention. At each of its ordinary meetings, it shall adopt the budget for the next
financial period by a two-third majority of Contracting Parties present and voting”
(Ramsar).
In the Ramsar National Reports, the issue of resources is addressed in two
sections: section 15.1 and 18.1. Much like with the CBD, the results here are mixed. The
allocation of funds is high in some cases and low in others. There does not seem to be
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any systematic approach for requesting funds or allocating them once received. The
Ramsar respondent was one of two that said the MEA had inadequate resources available
for implementation, monitoring, and compliance and that increased funding would
improve implementation, monitoring, and compliance.
The final question on the paper interview regarding resources asked if countries
that are financially compensated for compliance are more compliant than those that are
not. The MP respondent was the only one to answer “yes.” The CBD, Ramsar, and
UNCCD respondents all responded “N/A.” The reason for the N/A responses is not clear
but it could indicate that no mechanism is in place for compensating more compliant
Parties. The existence of the MLF probably precipitated the “yes” response from the MP.
The MLF is capable of providing the kind of compensation needed to assist the Parties in
compliance and probably has more funds at its disposal. The MLF is also part of the
institutional structure of the MP itself. Although the CBD and the UNCCD have articles
that specifically address financial mechanisms, they tend to be vague and provide no
institutional framework to house the mechanism. The UNCCD does mention the Global
Mechanism but no specific information is given as to how the mechanism will function
other than “under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties” (UNCCD).
Ramsar, because it has no specific article for financial mechanism, is even more vague on
how funds will be provided. It is apparent when comparing the four MEAs that the MP is
by far the most successful when it comes to implementation, monitoring, and compliance
and this is due in large part to the success of the MLF.
Table 5.1 serves as a summary of key findings for each of the four MEAs in this
study. Evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that institutions are important to
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the successful implementation of these agreements. Without the establishment of a strong
institutional framework, the MEA has little chance of succeeding. It is also evident that
implementation is a process that takes time and is not going to happen over night. If we
are going to evaluate “outputs” of these agreements, we need to give them time to
establish a record of implementation, monitoring, and compliance. Otherwise, they tell us
very little about the true nature of MEAs.
TABLE 5.1: Key Findings for Each MEA
MEA Key Findings Aspects of HI that can help
MP Most successful of the four MEAS in the
study; has successfully managed
implementation, monitoring, and
compliance. Has the most developed system
for distributing resources to assist in
implementation, monitoring, and
compliance. At this point in time the most
effective MEA in force.
Serves as an example of
how viewing
implementation as process
over time helps to
understand how the MEA
works. Focuses on the
importance of the
institutional structure.
Ramsar Seems to have all the elements in place for
implementation, monitoring, and
compliance but have had trouble bringing it
all together. Better organization and follow
through would probably help as would
additional resources.
UNCCD Still in the early stages of implementation
and monitoring. Parties are still in the
process of building the institutional
frameworks at the local levels through their
NAPs. Cannot consider compliance issues
until implementation and monitoring have
been successfully addressed. A lack of
resources is probably a stumbling block as
well.
CBD On the right track but still has a ways to go.
Implementation seems to be taking place
and monitoring devices are in place but
there seems to be a lack of follow through
right now. There also appears to be a
disconnect between national and local levels
as well as between developed and
developing parties. They currently have no
compliance regime in place.
The three remaining MEAs
all emphasize the
importance of the
institutions involved in the
process of implementation
and stress that successful
implementation cannot
occur without their
participation in the process.
These include IGOs, NGOs,
and private sector
organizations. They also
stress that implementation
is a process which takes
time and the timelines for
many of these agreements
stretches out over years.
MEAs are also macro issues
that require international
responses that involve many
groups and interests.
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Chapter VI: Implications of Findings
The paper interview and national report findings indicate that the four MEAs used
in this study are in various stages of the implementation process and are experiencing
varying levels of success. The MP is without a doubt the most successful and effective of
the four MEAs. It has been successfully implemented for many years now, has an
established system for monitoring in place including the ImpCom and the MLF, and
ensures compliance by regular reporting and follow-up. As the research in this study has
shown, the MP has an exceptionally high rate of compliance. Ramsar also has a
monitoring procedure in place that has proven to be highly effective. The CBD and the
UNCCD appear to be in the early stages of implementation and in establishing
monitoring systems and compliance regimes.
The overall tone of the paper interview was optimistic. Generally the respondents
seem to have confidence in their MEAs and the ability of the MEA to perform as
expected and produce results. The CBD respondent seemed a bit tentative in some of his
responses but it may just be that the agreement is early on in the process for the CBD.
The CBD did have the most involved National Reports so they are definitely heading in
the right direction. It may just be that it is too soon for the parties to the CBD to have any
sort of established record. The same is probably true of the UNCCD.
Even with a small number of cases the findings of this research are still
significant. First, all MEAs follow the same the general guidelines when they are
established. The negotiation process adds the specifics but the basic structure, including
the institutional framework, of all MEAs is the same. For this reason, even only looking
at four cases can give us a general idea of how MEAs function. Although the goals of the
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MEAs may be different, the process for attaining those goals is generally the same.
Second, because these four MEAs are considered core MEAs, they will be looked
at as either examples of what to do or what not to do when implementing an agreement.
Their success or failure in various aspects of the process should help to set standards for
future agreements. MEAs have been around for several years but we are still in the
learning process. Since MEAs have become the chosen method for addressing
environmental issues, they need to be effective. The only way this is going to happen is if
we understand what works and what does not. Even with a limited number of cases, we
can begin to understand how the process of implementation occurs and how that process
translates into effectiveness. Although this research is not generalizable it does serves as
a starting point for future studies and does offer some insight into certain aspects of the
MEA process.
Historical Institutionalism
This study of MEAs was done with an eye towards historical institutionalism.
Historical institutionalism generally “argues that outcomes are the product of the
interaction among various groups, interests, ideas, and institutional structures” (Koelble,
1995). This very much describes what occurs in the MEA process. There are two key
aspects of MEAs that make them ideal candidates for historical institutionalism. The first
is that institutions are central to the agreements. Sven Steinmo says that:
“in the broadest sense, institutions are simply rules. As such, they are the
foundations of all political behavior. Some are formal, some are informal, but
without institutions, there could be no organized politics” (Steinmo, 2001).
In the case of MEAs, institutions lay the foundation for how these institutions will
interact with the parties during implementation, monitoring, and compliance. This
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interaction is key to the success and effectiveness of the agreement.
The second key aspect is that implementation is a process that occurs over time
and it is important to understand this process in order to know what works and what does
not work when implementing these agreements. As Pierson and Skocpol point out:
“historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing
transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality. Historical
institutionalists likewise analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about the
combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one
institution or process at a time” (Pierson and Skocpol).
It may be years before the effects of any MEA are felt or understood. Looking at them
from a historical institutionalism perspective allows us to see what happens with these
agreements over time. The institutional framework of these agreements also take time to
develop and the “issues of long-term institutional development are also central to
historical institutional research agendas” (Pierson and Skocpol). Not only that but
“historical institutionalists see institutions as the legacy of concrete historical processes”
(Thelan, 1999).
A central theme to this research was that institutions matter greatly in the treaty
process. The institutional structure is established at the outset through a process of
negotiation and this structure remains in place for the life of the MEA. Although new
institutions may be added in the future, the core institutions remain the same. An MEA is
really only as strong as the institutions that are responsible for implementation,
monitoring, and compliance. Strengthening institutions, strengthens the MEA as a whole.
The general stability of the institutional framework is what makes the MEA function as it
should. According to Jonsson and Tallberg:
“the distinctive feature of historical institutionalism is that it allows for the
contingencies of history, emphasizes path dependency, and thus tends to focus on
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the persistence of institutions” (Jonsson and Tallberg).
This notion of “persistence of institutions” is one that makes historical institutionalism so
relevant to the study of MEAs. These agreements rely on their institutional framework to
stand the test of time. Implementation does not occur over night and it is important that
the institutions involved in this process remain fairly stable.
Studying MEAs as a snapshot in time serves little purpose. Without looking at an
established record of implementation, monitoring, and compliance, very little can be
known about the effectiveness of the MEA. Negotiation, to ratification, to
implementation is a long process and it is this process over time that needs to be
evaluated if we are to learn anything about the nature of MEAs. Historical
institutionalism allows us to do that. Historical institution is “not just looking at the past
but looking at processes over time” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 5). It is not enough to
simply look at the history of the development of MEAs. This tells us little about how
MEAs “act.” We need to look at the development process from the beginning, see how it
progresses over time, and observe the patterns of behavior that result.
Institutions are at the core of every MEA. Looking at human behavior in MEAs
tells us very little about the process itself. Through historical institutionalism we can see
how an MEA functions from beginning to end. The ongoing nature of MEAs almost
requires that we evaluate them from the historical institutionalists’ perspective.
Sovereignty
Although the small number of cases in this study does not allow for any sweeping
generalizations about MEAs, there are several important things to take away from this
research. First, the issue of sovereignty does not seem to be a hindrance to establishing an
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MEA. Although parties may give up some level of sovereignty to sign on to these
agreements, they sign none-the-less. By striking a more conciliatory note when
negotiating the treaty, parties are more likely to make concessions. MEAs are not a list of
demands on parties. They are guidelines with built in flexibility so as not to constrain the
parties. All four respondents on the paper interview did not see MEAs as being inherently
at odds with sovereignty. These parties feel that the problems addressed in the MEAs are
important enough to override any fear of giving up some amount of sovereignty.
Sovereignty has the potential to be a huge stumbling block in the MEA process
but those responsible for drafting the agreements have somehow found a middle ground.
This does not mean the negotiating process is easy but it seems to be fairly successful.
Countries are still signing on to MEAs and those that are already in force appear to be
working.
Collective Action
Collective Action also has the potential to be problematic for MEAs. There is an
expectation that parties will act in their own self interest. If that were the case then fewer
parties would be signing on to these agreements. For many of the parties to MEAs the
initial costs far outweigh the benefits. Finding the resources to implement an agreement
can be difficult, especially for developing countries. Not all agreements have an
established financial mechanism built in. Some benefits will not be seen for years down
the road. Parties that sign on are trusting that these agreements are going to be able to
deliver what they say they can. Countries are willing to put in a great deal of effort for as
yet unseen results. And the benefits rarely benefit just one party. Whatever efforts a party
makes will affect all those signed on to the agreement.
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The Ramsar respondent made an interesting comment on the paper interview
regarding collective action. The question on the paper interview asked if the respondents
felt that the collective good that MEAs produce outweighs the parties’ self interest. In
responding yes to the question, the Ramsar respondent also said that, “self interest should
normally coincide with collective good.” This seems to be a general view when it comes
to MEAs. It is in the best interest of parties to comply because they are part of the
collective good. There are the problems of shirking and/or free riding but this may not be
relevant to several MEAs. If Tanzania decides to take its responsibilities of the UNCCD
seriously and Namibia does not, Tanzania is the only party that is going to benefit from
that. Namibia will still be faced with desertification in its own country. Unless all of
Namibia is going to relocate to Tanzania, then it is in Namibia’s best interest to take its
responsibilities seriously as well.
A desire to enhance the collective good seems to be the prevailing theme, at least
in terms of the four MEAs in this study. The large number of MEAs in force and the
large number of signatories to these agreements would seem to indicate that it is a theme
of many of the MEAs today. There really is no room for self interest when parties are
dealing with transboundary environmental problems. If the global natural commons is
going to be managed and managed well, local, national, and supranational organizations
are all going to have to be involved. This will require a high level of cooperation from all
parties and this is where the MEA helps. But the MEA alone is not enough. One author
suggests creating a Global Environmental Organization to oversee these global commons
problems (Esty, 2004). This was initially supposed to be the role of UNEP but with the
increase in MEAs, UNEP has become overwhelmed and under funded.
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Creating a global environmental organization would help to centralize the process
at the top but the implementation process would need to remain a decentralized process.
Too much interference from a “higher” authority may hinder effectiveness and could
decrease the willingness of the parties involved to do their part. If it could be possible to
centralize the distribution of resources, including funding, technology and staff training,
in one institution but decentralize the implementation process to allow parties the
flexibility to deal with these issues to the best of their abilities, then many of these
agreements may see an increase in not only successful implementation but effectiveness
as well.
At the very least, an effort should be made to strengthen the role of UNEP in the
MEA process. Currently UNEP suffers from a narrow mandate, a limited budget, and
limited political support (Esty, 2004). These in turn hamper effectiveness. Presently:
“UNEP is nominally the focal point for MEAs but in practice has limited
authority and budget and therefore struggles to provide adequate support or
advocacy to MEAs” (Banks, 2006).
It may be easier to focus on improving the role of UNEP than trying to create a new
organization to oversee MEAs but it is clear that something needs to change if MEAs are
to have a chance at being successful.
Every MEA begins as a collective action problem. The question is asked, “how do
we deal with issue ‘x’?” Usually issue ‘x’ is one that affects the global commons and
requires an international response. This comes in the form of an MEA. In the process of
establishing an MEA, parties must decide whether they are willing to relinquish some
level of sovereignty for the common good. Members of the negotiating process must
work hard to develop an agreement that works for all parties involved without impinging
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too much on a party’s right govern its own territory. An institutional framework must be
developed that can stand the test of time and not collapse under pressure while still
leaving room to adjust if necessary. And all of these elements must come together
successfully to lay the foundation on which the future of the MEA will be built. This is
why viewing MEAs through a historical institutionalists perspective can be so beneficial.
The key elements are all a part of the MEA process: importance of history, process over
time, a focus on institutions and big, broad issues.
Contribution of this Research to the Literature and Scholarship
This research offers no new theories or models but does lay a solid foundation for
future research in the area of MEAs and historical institutionalism. MEAs are designed to
address problems within countries and across countries. The focus is not on the
individual. A guiding theme for most MEAs is that they will benefit the collective good
in some way. Institutions are essential to successful implementation, monitoring, and
compliance and it is necessary to evaluate these processes over time in order to find
patterns of behavior that will offer explanations as to why some MEAs are more effective
than others.
This research adds a new dimension to the existing literature on MEAs. It offers a
foundation on which to build future research. To truly understand how MEAs work, we
need to look more closely at the broader picture. We must look more carefully at the
institutions involved in the processes of implementation, monitoring, and compliance.
Weak institutions lead to ineffective MEAs. Strong institutions create effective MEAs. It
is important to know what factors weaken institutions and what factors make institutions
strong. It has already been shown that sovereignty and collective action may not
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adversely affect the effectiveness of MEAs. However, a lack of resources and
inexperienced staff within the institutions may.
Problems Faced by Future Research
Historical institutionalism offers an excellent framework for evaluating MEAs
and future research in MEAs should focus on the role of institutions and how the process
of implementation develops over time. This study only looked at four cases. A study
involving more cases would probably be more beneficial. The use of historical
institutionalism offers a new avenue for the field of implementation theory. MEAs,
however, are not without their problems and these problems also need to be addressed in
future research.
Capacity building must occur for any MEA to truly be successful and effective.
Many developing countries lack the capacity to deal with local environmental problems,
let alone global environmental problems. Developed countries, including private sector
organizations, must step up and be willing to provide the resources necessary for
developing countries to be truly active participants in the process. This is often referred to
as “common but differentiated responsibilities.” In this case:
“compliance assistance by developed countries to developing countries under
multilateral environmental agreements is one of those forms whereby the
obligation of some state Parties to assist others through capacity building is part
of their commitment to comply with the objectives of the agreement”
(Bankobeza).
If an MEA is going to achieve international cooperation it will need a “multi-tiered multi-
dimensional structure that engages local and national as well as international authorities
as well as local communities, NGOs, and the business community” (Esty, 2004).
There are also problems with monitoring and compliance that need to be
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addressed. Many agreements are vague on exactly how parties are to address monitoring
and compliance and many have no benchmarks for measuring performance of an MEA.
Although most agreements provide for some sort of compliance reporting, these reports
are not standardized and each MEA determines the format of their reporting. This makes
if very difficult to do any across the board analysis of the effectiveness of MEAs. As
Werksman points out:
“because most MEAs operate on the basis of self-reporting according to poorly
designed reporting formats submitted to understaffed secretariats, there is a lack
of accurate, complete, and objective information on parties’ performances.
Effective compliance information systems depend on the willingness and capacity
of parties to accurately and objectively gather and report data” (Werksman).
This in turn requires resources; something many developing countries often are lacking.
As well as centralizing the distribution of resources, it might be helpful to also
centralize and standardize the national reporting. Since the national reports are currently
the only way to really track the progress of implementation and evaluate effectiveness, it
would be helpful if all MEAs used the same standards to measure these things.
The key here is to have something to measure – some sort of policy outcome or
output. As Steinmo points out, “historical institutionalists are first interested in explaining
an outcome” (Steinmo, 2001). This is important because outputs and outcomes:
“represent the end result of a particular policy process. They are quantifiable. We
can operationalize, observe, and analyze them at one point in time or over
different intervals. Through this evaluative process we can measure how well a
given policy process works, since we can compare actual outputs to some
expected measure. An analysis of a policy output can therefore tell us if the goals
and objectives of the policy process or program under study are being achieved.
For this reason, policy outputs are critical evaluative criteria in examining any
policy process” (Waterman and Wood, 1993).
How we explain this outcome may vary. Although much of the analysis in this research is
qualitative in nature, a more quantitative approach to the national reports might allow
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policy outputs to be more accurately assessed and enable us to see more clearly if the
MEAs are being effective. This is one reason that the MP is so effective. Its national
reports produce this type of “quantifiable” data which allows the parties to see if the
measures they are taking are making a difference or not. According to Werksman, the
MP:
“is a landmark multilateral environmental agreement providing a precedent for
new regulatory techniques and institutional arrangements in each stage of the
compliance cycle, including mechanisms for adopting new rules, for reviewing
compliance with those rules, and for financing the incremental costs of
developing country implementation. Although threats to the ozone layer from
ODS emissions are still substantial, the rules, institutions, and procedures put in
place by the Protocol are generally regarded as having significantly reduced this
threat” (Werksman).
The problems with capacity building, resources, monitoring, and compliance are
particularly problematic for countries with limited resources and can have a trickle down
effect. According to Rosemary Banks, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the
United Nations:
“in countries with limited resources and technical capacity to devote to
environmental protection the demands of participation in multilateral
negotiations, coupled with compliance and onerous reporting requirements can
and does detract from domestic implementation of MEAs and addressing
nationally assessed environmental priorities” (Banks, 2006).
These are the types of issues that really need to be addressed before more MEAs are put
into effect. MEAs have the potential to successfully address the global environmental
problems that we face today and many already have. But they must also be effective.
Evaluating the MEAs that are currently enforce can help us to see what works and what
does not. If the areas that we find lacking are addressed properly then future MEAs
should have a better chance of succeeding.
There is also a problem of definitions in MEA research specifically and in
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implementation research generally. What do we mean when we ask the question, “are
MEAs effective?” Varying definitions can be found within the research and this can lead
to inconsistencies. Many view effectiveness in terms of whether the MEA has helped to
solve the problem it was created to address “but effectiveness can also be assessed
according to a range of different policy objectives” (Werksman). A definition of
effectiveness developed by UNEP would be helpful and should be specified within the
agreement itself.
Defining successful implementation can also be a problem. This is why it is useful
to have some sort of policy output to evaluate. As Waterman and Wood point out;
“there is general disagreement in the literature over precisely what is meant by the
term implementation success. By focusing directly on enforcement outputs, we
avoid a normative judgment over what is meant by implementation success or
failure. Instead, we can directly observe how the bureaucracy responds to specific
stimuli” (Waterman and Wood, 2004).
Although UNEP does define what it believes to be implementation it is still a very
generic definition. Perhaps a more specific definition would allow us to come to more
specific conclusions about whether MEAs are being successfully implemented.
Conclusion
According to a 2000 International Environmental Governance Briefing Paper,
despite the advances we have made in the area of environmental protection, “the state of
the environment continues to decline and the divide between developed and developing
countries continues to expand” (IEG, 2000). This is attributed to “weak international
environmental governance and the lack of political will” (IEG, 2000). We have figured
out how to address the issue of transboundary environmental problems. Now we have to
figure out to do this successfully and effectively. This is the reason that research like this
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study is so important today. This research attempts to introduce a new concept into the
field of implementation theory. Historical institutionalism can be an effective framework
for evaluating the role of institutions in MEAs and the effect they have on
implementation, monitoring, and compliance. As many researchers point out, historical
institutionalism has its faults, as do most other theories in political science. It also has
much to offer though and is ideal for evaluating MEAs. Much of the research in this area
has come in the field of International Relations from authors such as Oran Young and
Christoph Knill. But implementation of MEAs can have broad appeal to all
implementation theorists and further research is warranted in all areas of implementation
theory.
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APPENDIX 1: Paper Interview
14 November 2003
Dear Sir or Madam:
My name is Patricia Crouse and I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Oklahoma in
Norman, Oklahoma in the United States. I am presently writing my dissertation titled
“Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Challenge of Implementation” under the
direction of Dr. Jill Tao in the Department of Political Science. The attached survey and
your response to it will be an integral part of this research project. Your treaty is one of
only three case studies, therefore your response will be of great importance to scholars of
implementation who wish to better understand how environmental treaties might best
achieve national and international goals.
. This survey is being conducted strictly for academic purposes and all survey 
responses will be kept completely confidential.
A self-addressed return envelope has been provided for your convenience.
Your prompt response would be greatly appreciated.
If you would like a copy of the research results upon completion of my 
dissertation, one will be provided to you.
Should you have any questions or concerns regarding this survey, please feel
free to e-mail me at pacrouse@yahoo.com.
I would like to thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. The information
that you provide will make an important contribution to the literature.
Sincerely,
Patricia A. Crouse
Graduate Student, University of Oklahoma
PSC 7 Box 416
APO AE 09104
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Implementation questions:
1. What tools do you use for implementation?
______________________________________________________________
2. Who in your organization is primarily responsible for implementation?
Groups at the top
Local groups
A combination of both
3. What body or bodies in your organization is/ are responsible for implementation?
Please check all that apply:
Secretariat
Implementation Committee
COPs
Other (please name) ___________________________________
4. Does your organization hold regular meetings to discuss implementation,
monitoring and compliance? YES/ NO
5. Why or Why not?
__________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
6. How would you rate the success of implementation of your multilateral
environmental agreement?
Very successful
 Successful
 Somewhat Successful
 Not very successful
7. If you answered “very successful” or “not very successful”, why do you think
this is true?
____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Monitoring and Compliance Questions:
1. Do you currently have a system in place for monitoring compliance with
MEAs? YES/ NO (Please circle one)
2. If yes, what kind of system do you have in place?
__________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
3. How frequently do you monitor compliance?
Very frequently (more than once a year)
Frequently (at least once a year)
Infrequently (less than once a year)
Not at all
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4. What institution or institutions in your organization is/ are responsible for
compliance?
Please check all that apply:
Secretariat
Implementation Committee
COPs
Other (please name) _________________________________________
5. What tools (i.e. reports, logs, databases, etc.) does your organization use to
measure compliance?
__________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
6. How would you rate the success of monitoring for your MEA?
Very successful
Successful
Somewhat Successful
Not very successful
7. Do you find that, for the most part, countries comply:
Completely
Partially
Not at all
8. Are there parties that you find to be particularly problematic when it comes to
compliance? YES/NO
9. Can you give some examples?
__________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
10. If you find your compliance rate to be mostly complete or partially complete, to
what do you attribute your success? (you may choose more than one)
Successful Implementation
Successful Monitoring
Successful Cooperation of Parties Involved
11. If you find you have limited or no success with compliance, to what do
you attribute this? (you may choose more than one)
Problems with Implementation
Problems with Monitoring
Non-cooperation of the Parties Involved
12. Currently, do you consider your MEA to be:
 Very Effective
 Effective
Somewhat Effective
 Ineffective
13. For your specific MEA, do you find that most parties:
 Have both the capacity and intent to comply
 Have the intent to comply but lack the capacity to do so
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 Have the capacity to comply but no intent to do so
14. What method or methods does your MEA employ to gain compliance from the
parties to the treaty?
 Financial Incentives
 Formal regulations
 Formal punishments (such as sanctions)
 Reporting
Influence of Outside Institutions or Organizations:
1. Do any of the following “outside” institutions play a role in implementation,
monitoring, and/ or compliance (please check all that apply and the areas in which
they apply)?
 NGOs
 Implementation  Monitoring  Compliance
 IGOs
 Implementation  Monitoring  Compliance
 Scientific and/ or Technical Bodies
 Implementation  Monitoring  Compliance
 Private Sector Organizations
 Implementation  Monitoring Compliance
2. Would you consider the role these outside institutions/ organizations play to be:
NGOs:
 Very Influential  Somewhat Influential  Not Very Influential N/A
IGOs:
 Very Influential  Somewhat Influential  Not Very Influential N/A
Scientific and/ or Technical Bodies:
 Very Influential  Somewhat Influential  Not Very Influential N/A
Private Sector Organizations:
 Very Influential  Somewhat Influential  Not Very Influential N/A
Sovereignty Issues:
1. Do you see multilateral environmental agreements as being inherently at odds with
sovereignty? YES/ NO
2. Do you feel that some level of sovereignty must be relinquished in order for
MEAs to be successfully implemented? YES/ NO
3. In the case of MEAs, do you feel that the collective good they may produce
outweighs the parties’ self interest? YES/ NO
Resource Questions:
1. Do you believe you have adequate resources available for implementation,
monitoring and compliance? YES/NO
2. Does funding for your MEA include separate allocations for implementation,
monitoring and compliance? YES/NO
3. Would increased funding improve implementation, monitoring and compliance
rates for your MEA? YES/NO
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4. Is there a particular area (i.e. implementation, monitoring, and/or compliance)
where additional resources could make a noticeable improvement in outcomes?
__________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
5. Where applicable, are countries that are financially compensated for compliance
more compliant than those that are not? YES/NO
Demographic Information:
1. What is your current job title? _______________________________________
2. How long have you been at your current position?_______________________
3. For which organization or institution do you work ?________________________
4. What is your role in:
a. Implementation _____________________________________________
b. Monitoring _________________________________________________
c. Compliance ________________________________________________
If you would like to make any additional comments, a separate sheet has been attached.
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. Your input is extremely valuable.
Additional Comments:
132
APPENDIX 2: List of MEAs Paper Interview was Mailed to:
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
International Environment House
Chemin Des Anemores
CH -1219 Chatelaine
Geneva, Switzerland
John Sellar, Legislation & Compliance Unit Senior Enforcement Officer
Marceil Yeater, Chief of Unit
cites@unep.org
Convention on Biological Diversity
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity
World Trade Centre, 393 St. Jacques Street
Office 300
Montreal Quebec
Canada H2Y 1N9
Secretariat@biodiv.org
International Tropical Timber Agreement
International Tropical Timber Organization
International Organizations Center, 5th Floor
Pacifico-Yokohama 1-1-1 
Minato-Mirai, Nishi-ku
Yokohama 220-0012 Japan
itto@itto.or.ip
London Convention of 1972
International Maritime Organization
Office for the London Convention 1972
4 Albert Embankment
London SE1 7SR U.K.
The Montreal Protocol
The Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol
PO Box 30552
Nairobi, Kenya
Michael Graber, Deputy Executive Secretary, Ozone Secretariat
Michael.graber@unep.org
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands
Ramsar Convention Secretariat
Rue Mauverney 28
CH 1196
Gland, Switzerland
ramsar@ramsar.org
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United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCCD Secretariat
PO Box 260129
Haus Carstanjen
D-53153 Bonn Germany
secretariat@unccd.int
World Heritage Convention
World Heritage Centre
UNESCO
7, Place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP France
Francesco Bandarin, Director
wh-info@unesco.org
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APPENDIX 3: Glossary of Key Terms and Definitions:
1 date of acceptance--when a state becomes a party to a treaty; may mean either by
"signature subject to acceptance" (analogous to ratification) or by acceptance
without prior signature (analogous to accession). The text of the treaty usually
establishes which meaning of "acceptance" is meant.
2 date of accession--when a state becomes a party to a treaty of which it is not a
signatory. The right of accession is independent of the entry into force of the
treaty; that is, a state may accede to a treaty which has not yet entered into force.
3 date of adoption--when states participating in the negotiation of a treaty agree on
its final form and content. This usually occurs before signature.
4 date of denunciation--when a state expresses that it is no longer willing to be
bound by a treaty.
5 date of entry into force--when a treaty becomes binding upon the states which
have expressed their willingness to be bound by it. This is usually triggered by a
clause in the text of the treaty saying something like "this treaty shall enter into
force when n states have signed it ..."
6 date of ratification--when a state makes a final formal expression of its consent
to be bound by a treaty. This usually occurs after signature.
7 date of reservations--when a state makes "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, ... , when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State"
8 date of signature--when a state expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty.
Such consent is expressed "when (a) the treaty provides that signature shall have
that effect; (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed
that signature should have that effect; or (c) the intention of the State to give that
effect to the signature appears from the full powers of its representative or was
expressed during the negotiation."
9 date of succession--when a newly constituted state becomes a party to a treaty by
expressing its willingness to be bound by international agreements that were
entered into by a predecessor state or states. E.g. Russia might state its willingness
to be bound by treaties entered into by the former Soviet Union.
10 party--a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the
treaty is in force (Article 2, paragraph 1[g]).
11 treaty--"an international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation" (Article 2,
paragraph 1[f]).
12 (SOURCE: http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/guides/sec2.html)
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